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ABSTRACT

“The Most Forgotten Unit in the Most Forgotten Theatre of That War:”
A History of the MARS Task Force in the Burma Theatre of World War II, August 1944 to
October 1945 (December 14, 2013)
Matthew James Camina, B.A., Texas A&M Corpus Christi, 2011
Chair of Committee: Dr. Jerry Thompson

This thesis discusses the significance of the (MTF) in Burma during World War II and
how the MTF has been generally overlooked by historians. What little historical attention the
Mars Task Force has received has frequently been brief and inaccurate. The Mars Task Force
was a classified Long Range Penetration Force that trekked some 300 miles behind enemy-lines
and went on the offensive in Burma to weaken the Japanese in their war with the Nationalists
Chinese. This epic march was on foot, with mules, and supplied through airdrops. This thesis
represents one of the few studies of the Mars Task Force of any length and uses numerous
primary sources to chronicle their activities during World War II. This thesis is also of
significance in that it relieves the few surviving veterans of the burden of having been largely
ignored and bestows on them the credit they have long deserved.
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CHAPTER I
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BURMA
In the chaos and uncertainty of World War II, there were numerous campaigns in both
Europe and the Pacific that have received little scholarly attention. Although there were endless
bloody and historic battles fought across several continents during these tumultuous years, a few
military engagements have become mere footnotes to history. An example of this is the 1944-45
Burma Campaign in which the United States, Great Britain, the Nationalist Chinese, along with
the Burmese, fought a vicious war with the Japanese Empire. While a collaborative effort, the
forces that are best remembered for their gallantry in Burma were the British and the Nationalist
Chinese. Nevertheless, the United States played a significant role in the Burma Campaign. One
of the least known combat units that not only helped capture the Burma Road but reestablished
the lifeline to China was the American Mars Task Force. The Mars Task Force (MTF) marched
deep into enemy territory in Burma and conducted offensive operations against the Japanese.
According to one veteran, the MTF was the “the most forgotten unit in the most forgotten theatre
of that war.”1 During the war, the MTF and its predecessor, the men of Operation Galahad,
would be the only American combat troops to fight on the Asian mainland. The military
experience of the British Army in the region, however, greatly overshadowed the contributions
and accomplishments of the Americans.
Under Chiang Kai-shek the Burma Road became the last land supply route to

__________
This thesis follows the style of Southwestern Historical Quarterly.
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Nationalist Chinese during World War II; as a result of the Japanese attacks against the Burma
Road, the Nationalists were on the verge of collapse. The Burma Road during World War II had
become the last land supply route to the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek and the
Nationalists were on the verge of collapse as a result of attacks from the Japanese. The original
Burma Road was a series of railroads and roads that ran through Burma snaking toward the
Chinese border to finally reach Kumming, China. The Burma Road began in the port city of
Rangoon along the Burmese coast near Thailand. From Rangoon, a railroad ran to Lashio near
the Burmese-Chinese frontier, where the road linked up across the border onto a Chinese road to
Kunming. The Burma Road on the Burmese-Chinese frontier crossed over the rugged and
towering eastern Himalayas, which proved to be a formidable and dangerous obstacle. The
British had first opened the road in 1939 in an attempt to provide military supplies to China.
Supplies badly needed by the Nationalists had been stock piled in Rangoon, but due to
limitations on the road, reached the Chinese at a slow pace.2

Map of China-Burma-India. Courtesy of Gabriela Calderon.
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In World War II, Burma became significant due to the fact it was the last means by which
the allies could supply the Nationalist Chinese. The alternate supply routes through Shanghai,
Hong Kong, and French Indo-China had been seized by the Japanese early in the war. The
Japanese intended to weaken China enough by cutting off its connection to the outside world that
would lead to the country being easily subjugated. The fighting in China commenced in 1937
with the Marco Polo Bridge incident when Japanese troops, and Chinese troops southwest of the
current capitol of Beijing opened fire on one another near the Marco Polo Bridge.3 This incident
led to open hostilities between the two countries.4 Despite the incompetence of the Nationalist
Chinese, the United States hoped to support China’s struggle against the Japanese as quickly as
possible. The United States viewed Burma as the last pillar holding up China from collapse
under Japanese pressure; the United States also viewed Burma as the last means to prevent the
Chinese from reaching a separate peace that would leave the United States into more dire
circumstances than they already were in the Pacific. Thus this seemingly unimportant colony of
the British had become a vital link to the war effort of the allied countries fighting the Japanese
Empire for control of Southeast Asia. Realizing the strategic importance of Burma, the Japanese
formulated detailed plans to seize the country as part of their campaign of expansion into
Southeast Asia.
In an effort to isolate China further, the Japanese consolidated their spoils in Singapore
and began moving up the Malaya Peninsula into Thailand and Burma in an effort to close the
Burma Road and threaten India. The Thai government reluctantly allied itself with Japan by
providing troops, airfields, and safe passage.5 From Thailand the Japanese advanced into central
Burma and continued pushing west toward Calcutta.6 The sub sequential fall of Burma would be
the combined result of multiple factors that were partly created by the British that left the
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Burmese defense as nothing more than a house of cards that came tumbling down as soon as the
Japanese begun to advance. Because of Burma’s remote location and the German threat against
their homeland, before and after the Battle of Britain, the British placed Burma last on their list
of priorities. In addition, errors in the British command structure frequently placed their forces
in the wrong place to resist the advancing Japanese army and they were unsuccessful in stopping
the invasion. An example of the successful Japanese strategy was the rapid attacks by the
Japanese on Singapore and the Dutch East Indies that crippled the British command structure
leaving Burma isolated. All the British could do is reorganize and hope to eventually stop the
Japanese advance. The naïveté of the British is exemplified by the third British officer to take
command of Burma, Field Marshal Viscount Slim, who was said to have remarked that, “Burma
had seemed less likely to be attacked than Britain,” in explaining the lack of preparedness for the
Japanese advance into Burma.7
The Japanese began their assault on Burma with an air war against a small, but fierce
opposition formed by a few American and British squadrons. The planes of the American and
British were mostly obsolete, but the allied airmen fought gallantly until they were eventually
overwhelmed by Japanese reinforcements that arrived following the fall of Singapore where the
British had surrendered due rapid advance of the Japanese. The Japanese began bombing
Rangoon, the capital of Burma and a valuable port. The British colonial troops fought well, but
were not equipped for such a large and lengthy engagement. Over time, the Japanese ground the
opposition down by constantly outflanking them; the success of the Japanese attack trapped the
opposition, forcing them to fight their way out of a siege of Rangoon. Many of the British troops
escaped, but at a heavy cost in dead and wounded. With Rangoon lost, the British goal now
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moved to hold unto what was left of Burma until reinforcements would arrive, which they hoped
would be soon.8
With the Japanese closing the Burma Road following the seizure of the port of Rangoon
this left the British without supplies and like China they now became dependent on being
supplied by air.9 It was at this time that Gen. “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell’s Chinese forces moved
south from China to assist the British. The effective Japanese advances and Burmese anticolonial sentiment, along with Chinese officers’ incompetence, amounted to a grim situation.
The British been promised two army groups by the Chinese that was to be some of their best
equipped men. Instead, the two divisions that arrived and the men that followed were
underequipped. The distrust that existed between the Chinese and British forces further aided
the Japanese advance. British Gen. Archibald Wavell at first echoed the sentiment of his troops
by not wanting the Chinese support; later on, Wavell wished to gain at least two additional
divisions from the Chinese.10 British accounts of the war in Burma reveal that General Wavell
did want the Chinese, but a second opinion from the American General Stilwell revealed that the
British “didn’t want the dirty Chinese in Burma.”11 Regardless of the accounts of whether the
British wanted help from the Nationalist Chinese or General Stilwell’s anti British views the
allies did not get along which prevented a successful coordinated defense or counter attack
against the advancing Japanese.
At the time, the Chinese could boast that they held a better record fighting the Japanese
when compared to the British. There is little doubt that under the command of General Stillwell,
the Chinese reinforcements would fare better against the invading Japanese.12 The Chinese
arrived in Burma from the province of Yunnan “between February and April in an effort to
restore the situation.”13 The anti-colonialist sentiment gained momentum amongst the Burmese
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by the Japanese propaganda. The renewed resentment against the British resulted in many
Burmese showing the Japanese forces hidden trails that were used to outflank their opponents.14
Field Marshal Slim recounted later how the Japanese propaganda helped to make possible the
effectiveness of the Imperial Army in Burma: “The Japanese were able to move for several days
at a time through jungle that we had regarded as impenetrable.”15
The Chinese forces under Stilwell consisted of three Chinese armies, but they depended
heavily on the British for fuel and transportation. The Chinese held the lines well, but constant
attacks by the Japanese served to outflank the Chinese and it took its toll on the forces under
General Stilwell. In the battle of Toungoo, March 18-19, 1942, “it took three Chinese divisions
to hold off one Jap division and attack on that basis was out of the question,” Stilwell said.16
Stilwell had the title of commanding the Chinese forces in Burma, but this was a title few
respected, especially Chang Kai-shek, the leader of the Nationalists Chinese, who constantly
interfered with Stilwell’s orders. Chinese commanders, in order to please Chiang Kai-shek
himself, often found themselves disobeying direct orders of General Stilwell. The Japanese
began to break the allied lines on the flanks through Japanese allied Thailand. In the words of
General Stillwell, the Japanese moved through “dirt roads and jungle of the Thailand border on
the eastern flank in Burma and ripped the Chinese line wide open.”17 The whole defensive line
in central Burma was falling apart as the allies began devising how to withdraw to prevent
finding themselves surrounded when the Japanese moved against the supply hubs of Mandalay
and Myitkyina. The British and Chinese, realizing the lines could not be stabilized, began to
withdraw with the Japanese in hot pursuit.18
General Stilwell’s Chinese forces were thrown back or simply dissolved under Japanese
pressure. Stilwell himself retreated back to India on foot with a mixed party of Americans,
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British, Chinese, and Burmese.19 Suffering constantly under the onslaught of the Japanese, the
British, too, found themselves pulling back towards India. Having seized the Burma Road
junction at the town of Lashio, the Japanese prevented the Chinese forces from retreating back to
China. Chinese Generals continued to disobey General Stilwell’s orders as a result of Chiang
Kai-shek changing the orders himself to protect Southern China from being invaded. This lacked
discipline created a chaotic situation where no one was in command.20
The collapse of Burma made the vast majority of refugees fearful of the Japanese. When
the Japanese took Burma in 1942, it sealed off mainland China from all supply routes by both
land and sea. The only way to deliver supplies other than the Burma Road was by air over the
highest mountains in the world, the snow-capped Himalayas. This hazardous route was
commonly referred to as the “Hump” but eventually became known as the “Aluminum Trail”
due to the large numbers of airplanes that crashed along this dangerous and deadly course.21
At the Quebec Conference on August 24, 1943, the Allied powers began planning their
counterattack on the Axis. At the conference the decision to open a second European front was
agreed upon. At the same time, the Americans, would go on the offensive in the South Pacific in
the Solomon Islands. At the conference it was deemed necessary to keep China in the fight by
increasing the supplies being flown over the Himalayas. Retaking Burma was also a priority at
the conference. By doing so, the Allies could halt the Japanese from reaching the Indian frontier
and retaking the valuable supply route to China.22 It was decided “that the United States should
have at least a small unit of active combat troops in this theater,” in order to have influence in the
area.23
By September 21, 1943, troops from the United States had been deployed to Bombay,
India. In February 9, 1944, General Stilwell was given command of a newly organized
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American combat unit to be used as commandos against the Japanese. These commandos would
be deployed in conjunction with the British and the Chinese forces to retake Burma and
reestablish the supply route to the Nationalists. This combat unit, known as the 5307th
Composite Unit Provisional missions was to disrupt the Japanese in Northern Burma. The
5307th Composite Unit would be modeled closely after the British Chindits, a commando unit
that had operated in the area and who practiced Long Range Penetration tactics. All was part of
what came to be known as Operation Galahad that would specialize on these long-range
penetration tactics: “They were to go behind enemy lines, destroy communications and supplies
and disorganize and weaken the enemy so that he would be ill-equipped to fight the main force
following the penetration group.”24 The Chinese forces under General Stilwell would be the
follow-up force that would do the rest of the fighting after the penetration force had done their
work. 25
The first series of Chindit attacks faced many problems, including a high casualty rate
and the suffering of jungle illness, especially malaria. Over a third of the men were lost under the
leadership of Brigadier General Orde Wingate when the Japanese encircled the Chindits; this
would eventually force the Chindits to retreat all the way back into India in small, disorganized
and segmented groups.26 Despite the shorting comings of the Chindits, the Americans
established their own commando operation known as “Operation Galahad,” which would be
modeled and trained by the Chindits. The hardships and the losses that the Chindits faced would
not be in vain. Operation Galahad would benefit from their failures.27
Stilwell’s men, who composed Galahad, were volunteers from other areas of the Pacific
theatre, mainly veterans from the fighting in New Georgia and Guadalcanal. Army personnel
from the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tabago, and the American controlled Panama Canal Zone
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were also selected because of their experience in the tropics.28 Capt. Fred O. Lyons, who was
stationed in Trinidad for two years, was asked by his regimental officer, “do you want to
volunteer for a dangerous and hazardous secret mission in an active theater?” 29 Like many other
volunteers, Lyons gave an immediate yes to the assignment.
The soldiers of Galahad would be trained by General “Sword and Bible” Wingate who
had lead the Chindits. Capt. Lyons explained: “he told us every detail of his famous Raider
campaign in Burma the year before so we can profit by his experience and come out of the jungle
alive.”30 Training for Galahad would be conducted in the wilderness South of New Delhi, India.
The men of Galahad would train alongside British units such as the Gurkhas. The training
consisted of infiltration and jungle warfare. When the time came to deploy the men of Galahad,
the soldiers were placed under the command of General Stilwell rather than Wingate, a
command decision that caused considerable stress between the two generals. Wingate was only
in charge of Galahad for three months in what he said was long range penetration warfare.
Stilwell, however, would use the men of Galahad for a much longer period of time as a
spearhead for the Chinese forces.31
Operation Galahad began in January 1944, from Ledo on the Indian frontier and would
thrust southeast through the Hukawng Valley towards the Irrawaddy River. Galahad would
move in conjunction with a Chinese offensive along the Burma-Chinese frontier. The offensive
would be known as Operation Albacore with the 5307th Composite Unit and the Chindits
moving east from the Indian border. “The initial thrusts would liberate territory for the
continuation of a new road from Ledo,” written in Gerald Astor’s The Jungle War.32 Their main
objective was the large Japanese airfield at Myitkyina on the Burmese frontier with China.
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As Operation Galahad moved from Ledo a second road would be constructed called the
Ledo Road. The Ledo Road, or Stilwell Road, is often confused with the Burma Road. The plan
behind the Ledo Road was to link up with the Burma Road north of Lashio near the Chinese
border along the Salween River.33 Operation Albacore would begin with the soldiers of Galahad
seizing the area of Wlawbum along the Nambyu Hka River. The fight would prove to be
arduous with both Americans and Japanese using their veteran skills to the very best of their
abilities. It would be with the advancing of the Chinese forces and the implementation of
Galahad that the Japanese would be forced to retreat rather than risk being surrounded.34 Later
on, Stilwell would use Galahad as a means of spearheading a Chinese advance south to the
villages of Kamaing and Shaduzup in what was called Operation Thursday. The three battalions
of Galahad would excel in their job at setting up blocking positions to hold off the Japanese
forces while the Chinese laid siege to the villages. The fighting would be intense with the men
of Galahad being severely tested as to their abilities in confronting a more experienced Japanese
army.35
The final objective for Galahad was the Myitkyina airfield and village. Myitkyina was
also the base of operations for the Japanese in Northern Burma. The battle for Myitkynia would
be a brutal and bloodletting testing of the remnants of Galahad and their Chinese allies. In the
final analysis, Myitkyina would be valuable to Stilwell and the allies because it would serve as a
steppingstone for further campaigns in Northern Burma. The remaining 1,300 marauders of the
original 3,000 men of Galahad would cross over the 6,000-foot Kumon Range to attack
Myitkyina. Seizing Myitkinia was so significant that General Stilwell ordered raw replacements
and engineers who were helping to build and maintain the Burma Road, as well as
reinforcements from as far away as India, were pressed into to the fray. A member of the MTF
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stated that, “MPs truck drivers clerks and bakers, any man that can be found were pressed into
service from the rear-echelon in India.”36 There have been sharp historical criticisms of Stilwell
for sending green soldiers into action against the Japanese. Criticisms include those from
prominent historians such as Barbara W. Tuchman, author of Stillwell and the American
Experience in China, who questioned the effectiveness of the green soldiers.37 According to
Capt. Richard W. Hale of the MTF: “When the town of Myitkyina itself actually fell on August
3, all but about 200 had been evacuated,” from Galahad. Despite Stilwell’s questionable
command decisions, and the inexperience of the replacements the allies were able to take
Myitinkia, but with heavy casualties.38 Captain Lyons of set the record straight about the green
soldiers: “They were green,” he wrote, but “brave as hell . . . because the battle for Myitkyina
was reaching a crucial stage and needed men.”39
Operation Galahad successfully disrupted Japanese operations in northern Burma, with
Stilwell even capturing Myitkyina’s valuable airfield on May 17, 1944.40 Moreover, Operation
Galahad cut the Japanese’s Air Force’s ability to harass and intercept American cargo planes
such as the C-46 that were flying over the Himalayas to Kunming, China. Operation Galahad
successfully continued American combat support for the Chinese and exerted considerable
pressure on the Japanese.
By late 1944, Operation Galahad was declared a success by Stilwell, but his men were so
depleted from the ravages of jungle combat that they were, in effect, a spent force. Even before
the battle of Myitkyina, Galahad was suffering as Capt. Lyons explained: “Other illnesses broke
out among the men, yellow jaundice, malaria, stomach disorders, but we kept plugging on.” 41
Many of the men were suffering from dysentery, malaria, and exhaustion to such an extent that
the men came to curse Stilwell and his command. Stilwell had pushed the men of Galahad to
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such an extent that very few men remained who were not suffering from exhaustion or disease.
Captain Lyons express it best: “We just couldn’t take it anymore. Faster and faster men began
dropping from wastage of disease.”42 The men of Operation Galahad would become victims of
their own success as they were called on again and again to fight.
As the battle for Myitkyina was being waged, Stilwell issued “General Order No. 85, Hq.
USAF, CBI” that activated the new 5333rd Brigade which become the MTF under the command
of Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Arms and his chief of staff, Col. Willis J. Tack. 43 In October of 1944,
General; Arms was replaced by Brig. Gen. John P. Willey when Arms was injured in a jeep
accident.44 On August 5 another general order activated the 475th Infantry under Lt. Col.
William Osborne, who had survived the fall of Bataan in the Philippines.45 On October 4, 1944,
Colonel Osborne became ill and was replaced by Col. Ernest F. Easterbrook who happened to be
General Stilwell’s son-in-law.46 Two-hundred-fifty survivors of Galahad served as the core of a
new regiment, the 475th Infantry, and were thrown back into combat against the Japanese in
what came to be called “New Galahad.”47 The surviving replacements from the battle of
Myitkinya would also be incorporated into the 475th Infantry. Richard Bates, a Galahad veteran
who was brought into the 475th, explained how some of the men were pulling out of the hospital
as soon as they were ready for duty which brought the number of men in New Galahad to around
700. The other members of the original Galahad force were sent home. The 475th Infantry was
reinforced with over 500 trained cavalry troopers. Bates reflected on the training of these
dismounted cavalry: “We could give them the benefit of our experience.”48 Bates, also
explained how they had to train the former cavalrymen in the tactics and commands of the
infantry which they learned quickly.49
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One of these former cavalrymen was Richard W. Hale, whose introduction into the
infantry consisted of a long journey from Fort. Riley, Kansas to Bombay, India where he was
flown to Myitkyina and then trucked into Camp Landis a new training camp north of Myitkyina.
Honoring Robert W. Landis, a Galahad veteran that fell during the conflict, the camp was aptly
named Camp Landis. Literally overnight men were turned into infantrymen although they
retained the trimmings and gear of the cavalry.50 As written by Edgar Laytha, from the CBIRoundup the theater’s newspaper, they would all become the backbone of a new “long range
penetration unit whose job is to get behind the enemy lines in order to disrupt his
communications, the structure of strategy, to break up his defenses, to strike his most vulnerable
spots, paving the way for assault troops.”51 Their mission was unknown only that their name,
Mars Task Force, implied they were “to be a hammer in the hand of Lieut. Gen. Dan I Sultan the
theater commander.”52
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CHAPTER II
FORMING THE MARS TASK FORCE
Camp Landis would be constantly buzzing with activity; one veteran of Galahad
described the training base as place where “the GIs found a beehive of activity taking place.”53
While troops and equipment began to arrive at Camp Landis, the area was still being contested.
Japanese infiltrators and air raids were common. Another factor that made Camp Landis
dangerous was the plausibility of friendly fire. For example, in one particular case the Chinese
forces in Myitkyina would repel Japanese infiltrations, but would continue skirmishing among
themselves, confusing their own unit with that of the Japanese. In another instance, the Chinese
mistakenly aimed their mortars towards the friendly airfield rather than unto the intended
perimeter where there were Japanese snipers.54
Taken in their entirety, the Chinese forces in the Burma Theatre were a menagerie of
skills and experience. Many of the Chinese soldiers, for example, were so untrained and
unequipped, a commando veteran from Galahad recalled that “Many of them were lucky to even
survived getting to the front,” which ultimately led to mixed performance at times against
Japanese. 55 It should be noted, nevertheless, that there were exceptions to such descriptions,
especially in relation to Chinese soldiers who served with American-trained units. Even while
most of the Japanese forces had been pushed out of the Myitkyina area, it was all but peaceful
except when Japanese stragglers, who still lurked in the area.
In the book, Bastards of Burma, one particular example of how the area had yet to
become secure involved a member of the 475th Infantry named “Mike.” Mike, who had just
received a promotion, was blissfully unaware of a colonel who was only a few steps away. Mike
greeted the colonel by wishing him a good morning, but the colonel was upset that as an officer
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he was not properly saluted. Mike responded with, “sir our orders are not to salute around here
until they’ve moved all the snipers out of the area.”56 The colonel refused to take the excuse and
ordered Mike to salute him anyway. As soon as Mike saluted and went on his way a loud crack
was heard. Mike hit the ground knowing it was a sniper and when he regained his feet, he saw
the colonel dead on the ground. Mike’s immediate response was “they just don’t listen.”57
Over time, the 475th Infantry would come to number 3,257 men.58 As this new regiment
was being formed, the 124th Cavalry Regiment, originally a Texas National Guard unit, made its
way to join them. The 124th Cavalry debarked on July 24th from Long Beach, California, for
Melbourne, Australia, and then to Bombay, India, aboard the U.S.S General H.W. Butner, where
they joined the 475th Infantry on a new assignment in the jungles and mountains of Northeast
Burma.59 On August 26, 1944 the 124th Cavalry arrived at Bombay having left their horses
behind in California. Upon arrival in India without their horses, the 124th Cavalry gained the
distinction of being the last cavalry unit in the United States Army. Unbeknownst to them, the
troopers’ horses were auctioned off while they failed to receive new mounts in Burma.60
Joined by 530 men from the original troopers, the 124th Cavalry would move forward
with a total of 2,073 men. This number would later be increased with additional replacements.
After being injured during a training accident, Lt. Col. John H. “Cactus” Jack Irving would be
replaced by Col. Milo Matteson as commander of the 124th Cavalry.61 Without any horses, the
124th Cavalry would serve alongside the 475th Regiment; however, they would retain their
distinct title. Upon their arrival in India, the unit underwent intense training exercises and long
marches in preparation for combat. On October 28th, 1944 the 124th Cavalry joined the newly
formed 475th Regiment in Myityina, Burma for further training at Camp Landis, a few miles
north of the village.62
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The journey that the 124th Cavalry traversed from its creation until its arrival in Burma
was long and arduous. The 124th Cavalry was established in March 1929 at Houston as a unit of
the Texas National Guard.63 The men came from all over Texas, especially Houston, San
Antonio, Fort Worth, Corpus Christi, Mineral Wells, Brenham, and Seguin, where they had
undergone the standard National Guard training on weekends. Prior to America’s entry into the
war, on November 18, 1940, the 124th Cavalry, along with other cavalry units, was activated for
military service. The regiment spent 1940 at Fort Bliss outside of El Paso Texas in training
exercises.64 A large number of the troopers that would later become part of the MTF had joined
the cavalry to ride horses. “Being a old country boy I wanted to ride horses,” Trooper C. I Bray
later recalled.65 Some of the young recruits were so passionate about their dreams they went as
far as to lie about their age. A noteworthy example was Sgt. Robert Camina from Laredo, Texas,
who was in his mid-teens and lied about his age to be able to ride horses in the cavalry. Sergeant
Camina later explained that he had always dreamed of riding horses from a young age since he
watched so many actors ride them in movies. A large number of men from the 124th Cavalry
joined the regiment in order to avoid the draft. Joining the National Guard meant that they
would only need to serve one year compared to individuals who were drafted and were required
to serve three years in the regular army.66 In the desert near El Paso at Fort Bliss, the 124th
Cavalry suffered in the searing Texas sun and the cold desert nights, an environment that would
be radically different from that of Southeast Asia. After a short stay in Fort Bliss, the unit was
relocated some 850 miles down the Rio Grande to the more temperate climate of Fort Brown at
Brownsville. It was not until February 1941 that all squadrons were moved to the Rio Grande
Valley.67
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Border Training of the 124th. Robert Camina Collection.

The 124th Cavalry spent the majority of the war training in South Texas along the TexasMexico border in order to keep an eye on Mexico who had stayed friendly to both sides of the
war until 1942. Sergeant Camina explained that after a German U-boat was spotted close to
Veracruz, “We were worried because we didn’t know if the Mexican’s would side with the
Germans or with us.”68 In 1941, the 124th Cavalry would be responsible for patrolling 900 miles
of the Texas-Mexico border. John Montgomery, a veteran of the 124th Cavalry, recalled how
the regiment “kept a constant patrol on all bridges and known crossing sites.”69 For the most
part, duty along the border proved to be slow, the majority of the 124th Cavalry’s attention being
focused on keeping a good relationship with Mexico. During the duration of their stay, there was
only one minor accident that caused alarm between the two groups.70 After a couple of troopers
fell asleep at their post at the International Bridge at Brownsville over the Rio Grande and their
officer woke them, the startled men began firing at the Mexican side of the border. Hoping to
avoid an international incident, their officer ran to the other side of the border flashing his
flashlight and screaming that it was an accident. After the mishap, officers from the 124th
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Cavalry formally apologized to the Mexican officials.71 On the border the 124th Cavalry
practiced maneuvers in the countryside, as well as participated in parades in the border towns.
Being the last mounted unit convinced many men of the 124th Cavalry that “Mechanized warfare
had made it a bastard, and, most of the men were convinced, an unwanted and almost forgotten
one.”72 Many thought they would end up sitting out the war because there was no use for horse
cavalry in such a mechanized war.

Out on Patrol with the 124th. Robert Camina Collection.

On April 21, 1943, the fate of the 124th Cavalry changed dramatically. In a meeting with
President Franklin Roosevelt in Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexican President Avila Camacho
declared that Mexico would not be going into war against the United States. This fateful
meeting left the 124th Cavalry unit free to be transferred to Fort Riley, Kansas, where they
would continue to train.73 The unit remained in the Rio Grande Valley, however, until May
1944, before its transfer became effective. Once in Fort Riley, the 124th Cavalry would prepare
for the war overseas. Members of the cavalry would greet the news with surprise; many had
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become convinced they would sit out the war.74 The 124th Cavalry, among other cavalry units,
was chosen because of the men’s adeptness for animal husbandry. These skills would prove
invaluable and necessary for the long marches in Burma since the men would come to be
dependent on mules. During Operation Galahad and the deployment of the 124th Cavalry, the
majority of the men did not know how to care or tend to the mules which caused a lot of distress
during the duration of the operation. Consequently, when Operation Galahad ended, replacing
the men with a cavalry unit seemed only logical. Capt. Richard W. Hale of the 475th
commented: “Why all the cavalrymen, but no horses? The answer of course was mules, mules
and more mules.”75 As the troopers arrived in India, the Fort Riley trained men were originally
meant to join the 124th Cavalry but were scooped-up by the 475th Infantry instead. A grand
total of 599 men joined the ranks of the 475th regiment in order to further strengthen their
numbers.76
The men´s classic cavalry training while at Fort Riley was met with an incessant
wondering of when would their time come? The troopers believed they were headed to Europe
because their post office address was in New York City. However, the unit soon found
themselves traveling to California where they received additional training before being deployed
to the Pacific. The 124th Cavalry would be sent across the Pacific on the U.S.S. Butner and
spend one month at sea. One could say the trip to India for the 124th was a severe test of their
endurance. In the words of Johnne Alcoze, “Lord that was a trip.”77 The conditions on board
were almost unbearable with scorching temperatures, overflowing toilets, and men packed-in so
tight they became covered in one another’s sweat. Meals were served twice daily on the ship and
the lack of room forced the men to eat standing up. To make matters worse, the U.S.S. Butner’s
gun crews would practice in the middle of the night without previous notice, making the
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cavalrymen believe that they were under attack. Tensions ran high during the voyage and many
of the soldiers in the 124th members were convinced that it was only a matter of time before they
were attacked by the Japanese .78 By this time the Texas contingent of the National Guard
reached Bombay, India, they had shrunk tremendously. In fact, the Texas Regiment had
dwindled to less than half its original size and the unit would be filled by replacements from all
over the United States.79
The 124th Cavalry eventually wound up at Ramgarh, India, where there was additional
training at an Italian prisoner of war camp which also served as a training center for Chinese
soldiers who had been driven out of Burma.80 In Ramgarh there was little food other than army
rations and the men frequently went hungry. Howard Nicholson did recall having received fresh
meat which was either beef or pork. The meat was so fresh that Nicholson remembered “it was
still wriggling.” 81 Although the meat was fresh it needed to be marinated for long periods of
time. During this time, birds would swoop down and steal the meat from the kitchen tables.
Many of the men were unsure how the birds could even manage to eat what they stole;
Nicholson said the meat was so tough he was unsure how “those birds could eat it.”82
At Ramgarh rumors circulated among the troopers that they would be assigned fine new
mounts to go into combat. The special new mounts were thought to be horses from the 1st
Cavalry Division or perhaps Australian horses.83 Such mounts never arrived, however. While
in training, the 124th Cavalry joked that all the Chinese who were training along the river that
was nearby had received large numbers of mules. Later the Chinese were transferred following
the battle of Bhamo, and the cavalrymen received the mules they had joked about. At first the
troopers did not know how to deal with the mules. One veteran, Johnny Alconze, expressed how
“at first we hated them,” though another veteran of the MTF, C. L. Bray, remembered having
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fallen “in love with those rascals.” 84 The mules and the MTF men would have a love hate
relationship, but they would need each other for the ordeal that followed. On October 15, 1944,
the 124th left Ramgarh on steamships, trains, trucks, and C -47s for to Myitkina, Burma. From
there they were trucked to Camp Landis outside of Myitkina. It took a total of two weeks for all
of the men to reach their destination.85 Once at Camp Landis the troopers received their baptism
though fire during a Japanese air raid. In the words of John Randolph the unofficial MTF
historian, “Casualties: one full gasoline drum which received a direct hit and . . . several of the
tiny anti-personal bombs” that “pierced the wings of parked planes causing little damage.”86
While the Japanese claimed the raid destroyed several planes, the raid had done little more that
introduce the men to the combat. At Camp Landis there was only one casualty, an injury caused
by a soldier slipping and falling flat on his face when he attempted to escape the bombs.
Myitkyina airfield was less than peaceful, though the majority of incidents came as a result of
accidents rather than from the Japanese. In one particular example, the landing gear on a C-47
broke causing it to crash into a group of men. Several soldiers were injured and Pvt. Ferdinand
Anger was killed.87
At Camp Landis, the 475th Regiment was joined by the 612th Artillery Battalion and the
613th Pack Mule Artillery Battalion. Both artillery battalions were equipped with portable pack
75mm howitzers that could be assembled and disassembled to enable them to be transported by
mules.88 The 612th Field Artillery Battalion would arrive piecemeal from September to
November. The 613th Artillery Battalion reached Myitkyina on November 27 with under 500
men.89 In previous long-range reconnaissance units there was very little or no artillery, but the
MTF was given artillery to make it a more effective fighting force. Lt. Edward L Seagraves
described the evolution from Operation Galahad to the Mars Task Force, as “a force which had
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begun with no artillery had progressed through a two-gun platoon, then a four gun improvised
batter, to two full battalions.”90 With great enthusiasm Lieutenant Seagraves described having
twenty-four brand-new pack howitzers. These artillery battalions would prove invaluable to the
MTF because of their accurate fire which was used to soften Japanese defenses. At times the
pack artillery dueled with much larger Japanese 150 mm batteries that were feared across the
Pacific front.
The task force would also include a detachment of war dogs and their handlers, a total of
twenty men and nineteen dogs that were attached to the 124th Cavalry. The 475th Infantry
Regiment would also get sixteen men and their war dogs. The war dogs and their handlers
would do the thankless task of guard duty, perimeter patrol to detect any Japanese infiltrators,
and as scouts.91 A vast array of medical personal would be assembled to accompany the MTF.
These included the 18th Veterinary Evacuation Hospital, and the 44th and 49th Portable
Hospitals. Because of the nature of the expedition, twenty-seven American Nisei would join the
task force. The Nisei were divided into a team of interpreters while a second team was used as
interrogators. Independent, but attached to the MTF, was the 1st Chinese Regiment, that
consisted of 159 officers and 2,472 soldiers, as well as the 7th Chinese Animal Transport that
was divided among the American regiments. The 31st, 33rd and 35th Quartermaster Pack
Trooper would be assigned to the 475th. The 124th would have the 37th, 252nd and 253rd
Quartermaster Pack Troop. The pack troop’s job was largely logistical in that they would strive
to supply the regiments.92
In one last display of collective effort, the Burmese would join the ranks with the Kachin
Rangers, who had a deep hatred of the Japanese who had killed many Kachins. Their hatred ran
so deep that many of the Kachins would keep the severed ears of Japanese as war trophies. By
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the time the MTF was established many Kachins already had an impressive collection of
Japanese ears. The Kachins had been recruited by the Office of Strategic Service from the hills
and mountains of Burma. They were described by the members of the MTF as “tough little
people,” and “wiry looking.” 93 These men would prove to be incredibly valuable by having an
understanding of the lay of the land. Arguably the Kachin Rangers are the greatest asset to the
MTF in the tracking and language skills. As described by Johnny Alconze, “If it wasn’t for
those little brown men we would’ve not made it.”94 A platoon of the Kachin Rangers was
assigned to every battalion and squadron of the MTF. 95 This large hodgepodge of men and
mules that came to comprise the MTF was also officially known as the 5332nd Brigade.96
The MTF would remain in Camp Landis from October to November, 1944 where they
continued to train. The training held at Camp Landis consisted of long endurance marches
through the Burmese jungle where the men tested new equipment such as their recently-issued
jungle boots. The MTF would not have any real special training, but they did have training by
the Office of Strategic Services. According to John Randolph they also received training from a
mysterious Englishman whose name was anonymous for security reasons. This Englishman had
spent the vast majority of his childhood and youth in the jungles of Burma. “He conducted
classes on jungle lore, teaching them and how to make effective traps with nature’s own
trappings.”97 The mysterious man would also teach the soldiers the basic elements of jungle
security and how to live off the land, and how to barter with the natives. The Englishman
dismissed some of the jungle fears, but in reality a leopard sneaked into the camp of the 475th
and killed two of the war dogs. Eventually the leopard was tracked down by some of the men of
the members of the 475th and killed. Beyond the leopard there was no more terror from jungle
predators.98
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The MTF would remain at Camp Landis for three months. In the words of one veteran,
Louis D. Huse, the training “mostly consisted of walking with a full pack.”99 Huse also
remembered having to “eat a lot of salt pills.”100 It was in these months of constant training that
the men of the MTF received their mules, which would eventually be used to transport
everything from food to weapons. The mules would prove to be the most invaluable asset on the
expedition.
The MTF would begin their advance toward Bhamo major junction of the Burma Road in
order to protect the British and Chinese flanks from Japanese counterattacks. The MTF
objective would be to secure the Burma Road junction around Lashio from the Japanese and
assist the Chinese Expeditionary Force; this would be herculean task in which the men of the
MTF would begin a long march through the Burmese countryside. In late August, the MTF
would be assigned their first mission, known as the Thraikill Expedition. The expedition’s goal
was to make contact with the Chinese Y-force to determine if a shortcut to the Burma Road
could be found called the “Tengchung Cutoff,”101 the shortcut had been allegedly used by Marco
Polo when he originally traveled to Asia back in the 13th century. The units of the MTF that
participated in this expedition were the 38th Chinese Division, Kachin Rangers, and the 475th’s
Second Battalion. Accompanying them was a medical detachment, radio teams, and an Army
engineer. No enemy was encountered on the expedition and a small a small path to China was
found and nothing more came from it.102
Both the 475th and the 124th regiments prepared to move out of Camp Landis. In the
words of Johnnie Alconze’s company commander related the danger of the mission by “we’re
going to fight the Japanese you get wounded we will try to make you comfortable and leave you
on the side of the road.”103
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CHAPTER III
MARCHING INTO THE UNKNOWN
The mobilization of the MTF in the campaign for Northern Burma transpired with the
475th moving out of Landis from November 15, 1944 through the 18th. They were followed by
the 612th Field Artillery and later the 1st Chinese Regiment. The 124th and the 613th Field
Artillery would be the last group to move out of Camp Landis. The 124th and the 613th traveled
to Momauk six miles east of Bhamo. While the 124th prepared to move out, the 475th marched
towards the Tonka area. So would begin the MTF’s journey through Northern and Central
Burma solely on foot with only mules to help them carry the heavy equipment. In the case of the
124th Cavalry they began to march to Myitkyina passing the now deserted 1st Chinese Regiment
Camp. In the beginning of the march the MTF did acquire some vehicles including some jeeps
that were divided among the squadrons. Abandoned Japanese trucks were converted and
repaired to haul supplies.104 As the troopers marched the long process of getting the right boots
and toughing up feet would be their biggest concern. The Kachin Rangers also had an adaptive
approach to combat marches, they wore anything they could use such as native garments and
Chinese or American uniforms. 105
The men of the 124th would reach their destination by crossing over the largest pontoon
bridge in the world at that time over the Irrawaddy River. The 475th were ahead of the 124th
Cavalry and initiated their first mission toward the town of Bhamo. According to Michael
Gabbet of the 475th, “their mission was to proceed approximately 63 miles south in a circle and
bypass the town of Bhamo,”106 where the Japanese and the Chinese forces where fighting it out.
Bhamo was a crucial town on the Burma Road that was a crucial asset for both the Allies and the
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Japanese. At this point the original plan was for the MTF to bypass Bhamo and head toward
Lashio.107
While the march from Camp Landis to Myitkyina was only a twelve mile march, the
terrain exhausted the men. As they rested for the night medics checked for blisters and sores to
ensure a continuous march the next day. The Irrawaddy River was fairly deep, but the men of
the 124th Cavalry found comfort in knowing that there was a bridge to help them cross unlike
their predecessors. Having had left camp earlier than the 124th, the 475th found themselves
crossing the Irrawaddy River by a ferry boat since the bridge was still under construction.
Following the trail of the 475th, the 124th Cavalry Unit found themselves making their camp at
the same locations as their precursors.108 As the men marched through the construction area of
the Ledo Road they saw the gravity of the task at hand in which a small gravel road was being
converted into a major highway by the full might of American ingenuity and logistics. Soldiers
of the MTF would march through the construction site as trucks whisked by them carrying loads
of Chinese soldiers. Many of the men cursed the Chinese for having trucks to carry them as they
had to march with mules into battle.109 The supplies for the MTF would be air-dropped every
three days. Supplies were dropped by C -47’s by circling up to eight times around bivouac areas.
People known as pushers would literally push the supplies outside of airplanes which had no
doors.110
As the MTF pushed into the Burmese countryside toward Bahamo, the 475th was
harassed by both Japanese army probing patrols and the Japanese Air Force. Michael Gabbet
explained how, “at night they heard a Japanese reconnaissance plane overhead, trying to pinpoint
their bivouac areas.”111 Gabbet continues explaining the dangers of talking at night, by
describing an account of Japanese infiltrators at work. “Men in the perimeter gun positions were
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found hacked to death by nip infiltrators who had been able to zero in on them merely because
the men had engaged in low conversations during the night.” 112 The men of the MTF had to
remain silent at night and alert because throughout the wilderness were Japanese infiltrators and
their rear guards.
The 475th had their work cut out for them; their march towards Bhamo would take them
across a perilous road that crossed a 5,000 foot mountain range called the Loi Lum Range On the
steep trails along the mountain sides, many mules were lost due to their inability to balance their
own weight along with the heavy equipment strapped to their backs. Many of the animals fell
into the ravines and were never recovered. The march would also have the men cross mountain
trails in the dead of night, as Gabbet explained. The night marches took them “along trails
perhaps three feet wide, with nothing but a sheer drop to death should they lose their footing.” 113
The 475th then descended down the mountain into the foothills where they encountered small
villages and poppy fields. They would march up to seventeen miles a day over this terrain and
blisters were all too common. A poem by Pfc. Wade D Hall of the 475th described the march:
“So ever onward they did go with sore and aching feet. On shoulders rode a heavy pack with
straps that cut so deep.”114
On November 25, 1944, they were given a day off for Thanksgiving dinner which
included rations of turkey. By the end of November to early December the 475th was behind
enemy lines and unknowingly to the men at the time their objective lay ahead. Many of the
soldiers wondered why they had not engaged the Japanese in Bhamo for they could hear the
Chinese and the Japanese fighting in the distance. The men would continue to march, however,
ignoring the battle raging near them as they made their way east through the mountains.115
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From John Randolph, Marsmen in Burma.

Their objective was to aid and relief the Chinese 22nd Division near the village of
Tonkwa. Tonkwa was 125 miles north of Mandalay and had been recently occupied by the
Japanese and then wrestled from them by the Chinese 22nd Division. The 475th Infantry’s
orders were to hold the village until the Chinese 22nd Division could evacuate and fall back to
China to counter what was amounting to a new Japanese offensive. It was crucial to hold
Tonkwa because it could be used as an escape route for the Japanese fighting against the Chinese
in Bhamo. John Randolph recalled the strategic location of Bhamo which was “on the northsouth route which the Japs might use either in retreating from or an attempt to reinforce
Bhamo.”116 Contact for the 475th began in the villages of Mohlaing on December 9, Northeast
of Tonkwa, and Shwega, the following day, on the bank of the wide and free flowing Irrawaddy
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River. The battle for Mohlaing village commenced with two platoons of the Second Battalion of
the 475th being attacked by several platoons of Japanese. “A furious scrap resulted in this first
taste of combat for the Mars Task Force.”117
The platoons of the Second Battalion pulled out from the battle with four men wounded
and one killed. On December 10, the First Battalion was alerted by local Burmese that the
Japanese were in their village. The scouting patrol had come across this intelligence and was
immediately reinforced with a platoon led by Lt. Paul E. Bouchard. Once the scouting patrol and
platoon linked up, it was discovered that the Japanese in the village were preparing a meal and
the Americans immediately began preparing an ambush. The platoon deployed around the
village by splitting their small forces into two groups. The strategy behind this was that one
group would open fire causing the Japanese to scramble for cover in plain sight of the other
group. The ambush would have terrifying results with a total of thirty Japanese killed. “So the
entire party planned a fiery desert for them,” Randolph would write later. 118
By December 11, 1944, the Second and Third Battalions reached Tonkwa to relieve the
Chinese troops. Here the Third Battalion set up defenses northeast of the town. Michael Gabbet
commented on a regiment relieving a whole division: “Not bad—1,000 men from about 12,000.
How they expect them to hold, I don’t know.”119 The Japanese knowing the value of Tonkwa
attacked the 475th Infantry for forty-eight consecutive hours in fierce frontal attacks. The
Japanese veteran 18th Division would battle face to face with the new 475th. The Japanese
expected to fight their Chinese opponents but instead the 475th would make their presence felt.
The Japanese had reinforced the garrison of Tonka in an effort to push what they thought were
Chinese troops out of the area.120
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The 475th would receive a quick response from the Japanese as they manned their new
positions. The lines were constantly tested by probing Japanese patrols and barrages of knee
mortars, a type of light mortar. The Japanese would use their artillery with great precision and
effect. One platoon commanded by Lieutenant Chin of the 475th while encamped in a former
Japanese position was targeted by the Japanese artillery. According to Sgt. Gabe, he had warned
the Lieut. that the Japanese had probably zeroed in on their former positions. The Lieut. ignored
the sergeant’s pleas and concerns and believed him of being insubordinate. The next morning
would prove that Sgt. Gabe was right. The Japanese would open up with artillery fire wreaking
havoc on the men below. “Men who should have been dug in were running about in
confusion.”121 The Japanese may have been in retreat but their mortar fire was used with deadly
effect.122
By December 13, 1944, the Japanese brought up heavy 70mm and 75mm guns which
opened fire on the lines of the 475th. The men knew that the barrage was meant to soften them
up for an ensuing Japanese attack. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the lines did not budge and
they took heavy losses. As described by Capt. Richard Hale, “the charging Japanese ran [i]nto a
firestorm of 30. caliber bullets from our two machine guns, a dozen or so BARs (Browning
Automatic Rifles), and 30 or 40 aimed M-1 rifles.”123
Contrary to popular belief the Japanese still attempted banzai charges this late in the war
as Company F and Company E of the 475th learned. Randolph explained the banzai charge
outside Tonwka: “[I]t was duck hunting for the infantryman as they shot down between 30 and
40 of the yelling, wildly charging Japs running towards them.”124 According to Richard Hall of
the 475th who also described the battle of Tonkwa and remembered dodging bullets and pausing
to notice the large number of enemy dead. Hall also commented that he and his fellow soldiers
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were delighted they had defeated crack Japanese troops. “[I]t did our morale a lot of good to
learn that the Japanese 18 was a division that had conquered Singapore early in the months of the
war,” he wrote.125
The Japanese continued their attack on the December 14 with another artillery barrage
which set the battalion command on fire and killed a couple of mules. The Japanese launched
yet another banzai charge but it, too, was successfully repulsed. Once the MTF had turned the
tide against the Japanese attack the men launched a counterattack to clear out the remaining
Japanese. From December 15 to December 20, 1944, the 475th engaged in squad on squad
attacks and assaulted a number of Japanese defensive positions. The Japanese attempted one last
attack on December 18 with the same results as the previous attacks. Following the final assault,
the Japanese began to pull out leaving behind only a few stragglers who were either killed or
captured. The 475th had bloodied the nose of the Japanese at the cost of fifteen men killed and
fifty-six wounded. After the battle was over it was realized the Japanese had been trying to get
by the Americans in hopes of outflanking the Chinese 22nd Division. As far as the MTF was
concerned, “it had not only held Tonkwa, but forced the enemy to give up hope of retaking it and
make them retreat.”126
Outside of Myitkyina the men of the 124th rested and celebrated Christmas in the
countryside of Burma. Many of the men of the regiment were fearful and anxious of what was to
be the combat that lay ahead. Yet many of the Marsmen took great comfort in a respite to
celebrate Christmas. Some silently contemplated the fighting that lay ahead while others sang
Christmas carols. As indicated by Louis D. Huse of the 124th, “everyone read the prayer
book.”127 It was a great time to reflect on home and have a moment’s rest with a good meal. On
the other hand, Guadalupe Ortega from Saginaw, Michigan of the 124th described Christmas
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dinner as being “pretty quiet” as one hoped to “survive another day.” 128 In reality, the MTF after
the fighting at Tonkwa had “slipped into security silence.”129 The regiment did not officially
reveal itself until late January or early February of 1945.
Yet Christmas dinner was less than what the men had experienced back in the states.
Customarily they would get a warm Christmas dinner, but in the jungles of Burma they received
C and K rations. Some under the table deals were made to get food more accustomed to the
season. As the men of the 124th celebrated or reflected on the war and their location far from
home and the fierce fighting in Europe and elsewhere in Asia, the 475th celebrated Christmas
with relief that they had come out of their first combat alive.130 Christmas in Burma would be
short-lived and the MTF was soon on the march, this time over new ground that included even
higher mountains than those previously traversed and narrow paths. Their orders were to swing
around toward Lashio in order to block any Japanese retreat. It was generally thought that the
Japanese would retreat toward Lashio, and the MTF could set up positions to block their flight
along the Burma Road. The Hosi Valley area was chosen because it overlooked the old Burma
Road, and the MTF could use the high elevation here to its advantage. Hale explained how the
hills here were chosen because the Japanese, “had heavy artillery, tankettes armed with 40mm
guns, and many times our manpower.”131 A Tankette is a loose term for the varied types
Japanese light tanks.
Lashio would be an extraordinary journey of itself; the men of the MTF would go into
lands that no Westerner had ever seen. To complicate matter, the men of the MTF would have to
deal with an unpredictable deluge of rain which made the trails through the mountains even more
dangerous than before. In his Bastards of Burma, Michael Gabbet described the rain as
something never seen before in “the Western world.”132 As the MTF made their way into the
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mountains of eastern Burma toward Lashio, the 124th realized why they had not become a
mechanized unit. As they continued into the mountains it became clear that in this terrain mules
were far superior to horses or any kind of mechanized vehicle. It was at this time that the jeeps
and trucks that the 124th possessed would need to be abandoned due to the harsh terrain. In this
harsh terrain many men discarded cherished items along the trail, at times even their cherished
helmets, all in an effort to lighten their packs. Even in such a remote area the threat of being
discovered by the Japanese hung over their heads. In one instance, what appeared to be a
Japanese plane roared over the Second Squadron’s bivouac area. It was uncertain if the plane
was Japanese, but the situation made the troopers think twice about lighting a fire.133
A new problem arose with the Kachin scouts who were now out of that area of Burma
they were familiar with and now in an area known to be inhabited by other ethnic groups. It was
generally thought that the Kachin did not get along well with other ethnic groups who the
Kachin’s considered friendly to the Japanese. Small ethnic groups in the mountains had been
robbed by the Japanese as they retreated from the Chinese and they had few items of trade or
anything to give to the American troops.134 The Kachins were given the task of scouting ahead
of the MTF, at times administering their own justice on villages that were thought to be friendly
to the Japanese. When two veteran of Operation Galahad who were in the MTF asked about the
Kachins who were thought to be under command of the first sergeant, the sergeant replied, “yeah
I’ve got 40 men, but I really don’t have much control over them.”135 The first sergeant went on
to admit that the Kachins took orders from an O.S.S. officer and that he rarely saw them since
they were always on reconnaissance and performing duties that were not officially reported.136
Multiple veterans of the MTF, in an effort to prove how high up they were in the
mountains, said the water in their canteens would freeze and ice would form on their helmets
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since they were in elevations of at least 6,000 feet.137 “Many men held on the tails the mules on
the mountain sides,” to avoid falling, one soldier remembered. 138 During the mountainous trek,
men from both regiments had to be evacuated because of what came to be known as marching
casualties. Areas were cleared in the jungle for small “L” and “L-5B1” planes to land.
Sometimes the L evacuation planes landed in Burmese rice paddies.139 These tiny, propellerdriven planes only had the load capacity of 400 pounds which meant that only two Marsmen
could be evacuated at a time. They were crucial, nevertheless, in the evacuation of any
casualties. These marching casualties would have to reach these airfields for evacuation either
on their own two feet or by one of the few riding mules.140
Many mules were lost to falls along the route due to the narrow trails in the high
mountains although some would recover and provide a new definition to “stubborn as a mule.”
Unfortunately, many of these hardy animals did die from their falls. “They lost 14 mules over
mountains as high as 7,800 feet as the unit pushed on,” it was reported.141 The Marsmen would
survive and press on. “They defied the very devil, moved on in rain or shine,” these are the
words of Wade D. Hall.142
Coming down from the mountains, the MTF would have to deal with a new danger in the
difficult terrain that had the colorful name of “Shweli Slide” that referred to the topography near
the Shweli River. 143 The name derives from the mountain sides that were now saturated with
rain that made the red clay soil slick and slippery and inflict havoc on both the Marsmen and
their mules. The Mules would sit flat on their rump and slide all the way down the slick grass.
The danger was that one of them could land on a soldier or once they arrived at the bottom, the
gear they were carrying would be flung off across the area and had to be recovered and the packs
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secured again. Slugging through the countryside of Burma would deprive the MTF of contact
with the Japanese and the morale of the men plummeted.144

Snap Shots from the Mars Task Force. Robert Camina Collection.

To make matters worse, supply drops were few due to the mountainous terrain and the
heavy rain storms that prevented the C-47s from flying. In some instances, the supplies that
were dropped would last only one day which would weigh heavy upon the Marsmen considering
their rations were already depleted. Through the mountains and the lack of supplies many of the
men went days without eating. Finally, they reached the banks of the Shweli River where they
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found a bridge that had been hastily thrown up by the Chinese who were scattered throughout the
area. The bridge was merely a hodgepodge of bamboo and string strung together and was close
to falling apart above the swollen river. Both regiments of the MTF would have to cross the
river and although they did this one mule at a time, the men were fearful that the bridge would
collapse. It would be a completely different undertaking for the men of one of the artillery
battalions. They were forced to lead their mules across the bridge and then carry the equipment
in a second trip. This river was not an easy obstacle to overcome, and John Randolph
remembered “the current was too swift to swim against.”145 Their goal was to reach the area
known as Shweli and then regroup with the rest of the task force to press on toward Bhamo,
which was under siege by the Chinese because it had a serviceable airfield and a valuable road
that lead to Mandalay. Before the MTF could arrive, Bhamo fell to the Chinese and the plans for
the regiment were changed once again.146
The 475th was ordered to head toward an area called Mong Wi, southeast of Bhamo.
Mong Wi is also a loose term for a part of the valley along with remnants of two villages and the
hills surrounding it that were covered in terraced rice paddies. As soon as the 475th arrived and
were resupplied with several airdrops they received their new marching orders. They were to
hike fifteen miles to the east into the mountains to rescue the crew of a downed C-47. The
mission was led by Lt. Vern Mahoney accompanied by two platoons and native guides. Once
they were in the mountains, the terrain became hazardous and the men had to be extra cautious.
Luckily natives came out of the forest and led them to the village of Ho-Kai where the natives
had already rescued the crew members of the downed plane. All six men were accounted for but
two were critically injured. As the men made their way down the mountain with the rescued
comrades one succumbed to his wounds only an hour away from the field hospital.147 The 124th
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also relieved the 475th of some of the casualties they were unable to carry. One of these was a
brave soldier named Joseph Doyer who was successfully evacuated but died in the hospital.
Doyer had served with the Canadian Army in the World War I and had fought with the
marauders during their entire Burma campaign and then with the 475th. Col. Ernest
Easterbrook, commander of the 475th, had commended Doyer for his “never quit” attitude and
for being a loyal soldier.148
In Mong Wi, the 475th set up operations with the Kachin Rangers and established a
marketplace to trade with local natives. There were no Japanese in the area and only traces of
their handiwork that included desecrated local temples and idols. During this short respite, the
men of the 475th swapped stories and retrieved new supplies. The 124th followed, but it became
abundantly clear that the Japanese would not use this area for any evacuation attempts and the
MTF would have to set up their blocking positions further behind enemy lines 149 The MTF was
given a new objective of marching east to a Japanese held area called Nanhpakka on the Burma
Road where the Japanese were fighting the Chinese. Getting there would be another harsh trek
since the excursion would again take them into the mountains. “We’ve got three mountain
ranges to cross, and if you think you’ve climbed mountains before, you ain’t seen nothing yet,”
one soldier wrote150 The MTF would be crossing the 5,000 to 7,000-feet Loi Lum Mountains
which “separated Mong Wi and the Burma Road.”151 The march would be especially grueling
because of the lack of food and many men were suffering from fatigue to the point they had to be
evacuated. The last leg of the journey for the 475th was a twenty-two hour hike off the beaten
path through the jungle. This was done to conceal their movements from the Japanese and to
arriver closer to the Hosi Valley. W. F. Kramer described the condition of the march: “[I]t was
pitch black under the trees and men tied their compasses on the backs of their packs so they
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could keep in touch with one another by watching the illuminated compass dials.”152 Kramer
also remembered how the men would tie themselves together to avoid getting lost. The mules
suffered greatly in this last hike, and it was remembered how they “slipped on hillsides and
tumbled into treetops far below. Some spirited themselves into clumps of bamboo.”153 Each
mule that was lost caused more heart ache for the Marsmen as they would have to carry the loads
of ammunition and supplies themselves.154 Sgt. Gabe recorded how as the regiment moved to
the Hosi Valley “at least 30 are waiting for evacuation.”155 In addition to the casualties, the men
had not received food in two and a half days and some of the men were already suffering from
typhus and malaria. At this time none of the men could be evacuated, because they had to be
brought down the mountain with the help of natives to the nearest landing strip.156
At this point, Sergeant Gabe summarized the uniqueness of the war in Burma: “They say
this is a mechanized war, but not here in Burma,” he wrote.157 Despite these handicaps the men
of both regiments pushed onward to their objective of Namhpakka, the Japanese stronghold west
of the Burma Road.
The Hosi Valley was chosen by General Stilwell’s replacement, Gen. Daniel Isom Sultan, who
had argued with the commander of the 475th Colonel Easterbrook and General Willey, the
overall commander of the MTF, over how to deploy the MTF against the Burma Road. Colonel
Easterbrook had suggested cutting the Burma Road and the only suspension bridge around for
miles which was north of Namkpakka. Colonel Easterbrook argued that the terrain could be
used to the American’s advantage to put machine gun fire on the road itself. The other
advantage was the Japanese could not bypass any of the roadblocks by alternate trails through
the jungle.158
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General Sultan disagreed and chose to proceed through the Hosi Valley because the Chinese
could not support an advance that deep into Japanese territory. The area chosen by Easterbrook
did not offer any sites that could have been used as a landing strip compared to the Hosi Valley.
The Sultan’s plan did have some disadvantages in that the Japanese could use alternate roads to
bypass any roadblock and the hills were too far away for the MTF to put machine gun fire
directly on the Burma Road. General Sultan pressing the men of the MTF to proceed toward
Nawhkam without any direct support from the Chinese, especially the 1st Chinese Regiment.159
It was becoming apparent that the Japanese were losing Burma with the British pushing
from the west and the Chinese advancing from the north. The Japanese Army needed to hold
this stretch of highway and the surrounding hills to be able to pull back its troops from Burma
and western China. The Allied strategy was for the MTF, in conjunction with the 38th Chinese
Division, to established roadblocks along the Burma Road to prevent the Japanese from escaping
again. The final stroke would come from the Chinese 1st Division, the Chinese 38th Division,
and the Chinese 114th Regiment that were moving down the Burma Road to relieve the MTF.
The allied effort of the MTF was coordinated to boost the morale of the Chinese.160
The battalions and squadrons of the MTF were to take certain hilltops in order to disrupt
the Japanese in the area and disrupt Japanese traffic on the Burma Road. Richard Hall, a
member the 475th, summed up their objective best in realizing the Americans had to take the
hills on the east side of the Hosi Valley in order to cut the Burma Road. Such a maneuver
would put the MTF “behind a mix bag of regiments from the Japanese 49th, 55th, and 56th
divisions.”161 Because of the large number of Japanese troops, both armor and artillery, the idea
of a roadblock changed to a more realistic “fire block” position using the hills as cover the flow
of Japanese forces on the road.162 John Randolph comments on how competition to meet the
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Japanese was high among the men and who was to make the first contact with the Japanese. It
was certain that the Japanese would not retreat and the MTF was certain to confront them. The
Japanese would stand their ground because this territory along the Burma Road would be crucial
to their hopes of reinforcing the central part of the country.163 This would be the last leg of the
journey for the MTF with the 124th leading the charge. “Well from what I gather, it’s going to be
an all-out offensive against the road, the 475th, the 124th with attached elements, plus the
Chinese, and as I understand it, some support from their corps,” Capt. Kidder of the 475th
wrote.164
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CHAPTER IV
INTO THE HOSI VALLEY
The 124th set out on January 15, 1945, in an effort to arrive ahead of the 475th. On
January 20 the 124th reached an area called Kawngsong. After getting lost in the jungle several
times, the 124th progressed toward their objective. The Third Squadron led the assault,
zigzagging south towards the Japanese outposts. Marching only two miles, they crossed the
same freezing stream sixty-two times, all in an effort to avoid detection by the Japanese. Their
goal was to make it to the staging area between the villages of Mong Noi and Hpa-pen, west of
the Burma Road. Both the 124th and the 475th were to take the rigid lines along the Burma
Road in order to harass the Japanese 56th Division to the north that was fighting the Chinese.
Although the Japanese 56th was to the North, the Japanese had a vast array of units situated
directly in the path of the MTF. Some of these units included the 168th Regiment to the north of
the MTF, the 4th Regiment, 2d Division, and the Yamazaki Detachment situated south and
northwest of the MTF. In all, the Japanese had some 11, 500 troops in the vicinity or adjacent to
the MTF’s objectives. 165
A poem quoted in William Sinclair’s “Confusion Beyond Imagination” by Pfc. Leo J. Shanky
accurately describes the feelings of the Marsmen as they approached the Hosi Valley:
“Will We sling our rations, still in their sacks, over our shoulders, on top of our packs.
And off we go to do the business of war with our hearts beating like drums.”166
When the MTF arrived in the proximity of the Hosi Valley, the 475th had traversed 300 miles
and climbed mountains as high as 6,700 feet. The 124th Calvary had marched 279 miles and had
crossed four mountain ranges, “including the 7,800-foot Loi-Lum range and they had reached
their objective south of Kawnsong on empty stomachs.” 167
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The 124th made first contact with the enemy at Nawhkam three miles west of the Burma
Road where the Japanese had set up an ambush for the 124th and waited until the Americans
had passed. The Japanese waited until the headquarters unit past and opened fire on them. Capt.
Blair was ordered to patrol up a hillside to flush out the Japanese when he and his men were
ambushed and the captain was wounded. As the men in the patrol scaled the hillside, climbing
more than seven hundred feet while firing their weapons, they reached the crest only to find the
Japanese positions abandoned. Most of the regiment continued to push toward their main
objective of Namhpakka, the enemy’s staging area. On January 15, 1945, the 475th turned south
toward the hills of Loi-kang along the Burma Road.168 John Randolph, the MTF unofficial
historian described the blunt hatred and bloodlust of the MTF towards the Japanese in the
upcoming battle. “[T]he Marsmen came in determined that the Nips would not hold, and if they
were foolish enough to die in the attempt—which they were—die they would.”169
The battle for the Hosi Valley began with First and Third Battalions of the 475th
attacking Nawhakm Hill while the Second Battalion was positioned south of the objective. The
topography of the Hosi Valley consisted of a series of heavily wooded ridges along both sides of
the valley. Several native Burmese villages were located along these ridges. Between the ridges
were several large hills ranging from 250 feet to 4,250 feet in height. One of those hills was
known as the Loi-Kang and was named after the nearby Kachin village. To the east of Loi-Kang
lay the Burma Road. By gaining possession of these ridgelines and hills, south, north and east,
the MTF could command the valley with their artillery. The overall size of the battlefield itself
would only measure four miles across.170
The first contact with the Japanese was by I and R Platoons of the First Battalion who
were in advance of the main body. These two platoons encountered a village which was
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occupied by the Japanese where a firefight broke out. The platoons had to fall back to regroup
with E Company, and it would take the entire company to seize the village. The battle would
soon turn to company versus company fighting along the hillside. The Japanese were eventually
pushed off the hillside which enabled the C- 47s cargo planes to begin making approaches for
resupplying the regiment. The supply drops were critical for the MTF operation to succeed, due
to the large amount of ammunition consumed and rations necessary to keep the men battle ready.
Resupply for the MTF would become increasingly difficult as the Japanese attempt to overrun
the supply drop areas. At the same time, the fierce Japanese anti-aircraft fire drove off several of
the C-47s that were resupplying the men. The supply drop areas also became a substantial
handicap for the MTF since they had to defend the areas while simultaneously seizing their
objectives. Despite the supply problems, the Americans fought ferociously even with the lack of
rations. At times the Marsmen went forward into battle with little more than vitamin pills and
stolen Japanese rations.171

As the First Battalion was launching its offensive, the Third Battalion advanced through
the night into the Hosi Valley in preparation of a predawn attack. This strategy worked for the
time as elements of Third Battalion surprised the Japanese in the valley. As the First Battalion
pushed forward, they ran into strong Japanese opposition, however, and the Japanese hurriedly
reinforced their positions. Nevertheless, the 475th was successful in capturing the ridgelines and
the Nawhkam village on the western side of the valley. As the Japanese reinforced that small
area the reminder of the Third Battalion seized the hillside which gave the 475th and the 612th
Field Artillery the advantage by shelling the Japanese positions. The potency of the 612th Field
Artillery was felt by the Japanese commencing on January 18. As John Randolph, the Mars Task
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Force’s historian, put it “they were more targets to engage than there was ammunition
available.”172 From their vantage point the 612th Field Artillery could fire onto the Burma Road
and nearby Japanese positions. The Japanese failed to counterattack largely as a result of the
effectiveness of the artillery. In the midst of the shelling, one of the Japanese supply dumps was
hit and it exploded. The Japanese that confronting Third Battalion was torn to pieces, according
to Randolph, the Japanese had “some 20 truckloads of their own casualties” that “were picked
up.”173 At the same time, elements of the First Battalion were committed to rear-guard action
along with the Kachin Rangers on the southern end of the Loi Kang Ridge where they guarded
the area to prevent any Japanese flanking maneuvers. Richard Hale was among those in the rearguard unit on the morning of January 3, 1945, as the Japanese launched a series of Banzai
charges. “[W]e could hear the screaming and constant gunfire, but we could do nothing to help,”
Hale wrote 174 Most of the Japanese attacks were hurled back by the Americans and the
Japanese suffered horrendous casualties.
As the 612th Field Artillery was making their presence known, the Second Battalion of
the 475th initiated their assault toward the south. During this process, the Japanese outposts
were sandwiched between the First Battalion and the Second Battalion. At this time, the Third
Battalion moved through the First Battalions positions and seized the hillside settlement that
overlooked the Burma Road to the north of the valley. The 475th only encountered light
resistance against Japanese outposts along the hillsides.175 On January 18, the MTF continued to
advance toward Loi-Kang Ridge to the north of the valley while the Third Squadron, the Second
Battalion, and the Third Battalion attempted to take the hills that overlooked Namhapakka. This
smooth sailing for MTF against the Japanese would come to an abrupt end. After the Third
Battalion achieved their objective on Loi-Kang Ridge, the Second Battalion would run into
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trouble south of Loi-Kang ridge where they encountered the First and Second Battalions of the
Japanese Fourth Regiment of the Second Division. On the night of January 18, the Japanese
received reinforcements including the Yamazaki Detachment that reinforced the Fourth
Regiment. While this was happening, on January 19, 1945, the Third Squadron of the 124th
moved northeast of the Second Battalion of the 475th to commence their attack.176
The Japanese were aware that the high ground was being taken by the Second Battalion
and they began to have a slugging match with the Americans for the crest of Loi-Kang ridgeline
and the village at the top of it. The Japanese were dug in on both sides of the ridge which gave
them a considerable advantage. By two o’clock in the afternoon the men of Second Battalion
had no choice, but to storm the Japanese positions. The frontal assault would be successful but
costly, with seven Americans killed and seventeen wounded. But the Japanese abandoned a
valuable position.177 The Japanese reacted with stiff resistance and began firing one of their
most feared weapons, the 150-mm howitzer that delivered a devastating blow to the men of the
MTF. The MTF was able, nevertheless, to consolidate their positions around Nawhkam to the
east and Loi-Kang to the north. The Third Battalion was confronting the Japanese stronghold
along the Burma Road at Namhpakka and thus the Third Battalion and the Japanese were on two
separate hills facing each other. During the night, the Third Battalion repulsed two Japanese
banzai charges that came from the north and east. The three battalions of the 475th would have a
difficult time taking their objectives because the Japanese had reinforced their side of the Loi
Kang Ridge which made it incredibly difficult due to its topography. Each slope of the ridge had
to be taken by a frontal assault.178
As contact became fierce between the MTF and the Japanese, each side began probing
actions to discover the exact position of the other. An example of the 475th attempting to halt
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traffic on the Burma Road was by Company E of the Third Battalion in what was called “a
rolling ambush.”179 This ambush was conducted on January 19, 1945 after positions near Loi
Kang had been taken. A small ambush patrol totaling twenty-six heavily armed men was sent
out. Robert P. Rose, the machine gunner of this ambush, described their advance on the Burma
Road: “[L]ate in the evening, just as the sun began to set, we left the battalion perimeter bound
for a night of marauding.”180 The patrol bivouacked 500 yards from the Burma Road in
complete darkness and then commenced crawling forward until they were only ten yards from
the road. The men were hoping to see at least a truck on the road but instead, according to Rose,
encountered a Japanese tank which stopped only 200 yards in front of them. Rose feared the
Americans might be spotted, but the tank stopped at a sentry who shockingly told the tank crew
in English that “the road is all clear.”181 As the tank began to move forward the ambush was
sprung with a bazooka team knocking out the tank. The second part of the ambush was to throw
a flare at the tank and then run. The flare was a signal for the artillery to hammer the position.
The men of E company fell back and set up a second ambush that caught a Japanese patrol
pursuing them. Before dawn the men hoped to set up a third ambush for any Japanese patrol that
might be trailing them. Luckily no such patrol came and the men of E Company made it back to
the safety of their perimeter.182
On January 19, 1945, the Third Squadron of the 124th had multiple encounters with
Japanese patrols. The probing actions by Third Squadron were meant to scout and avoid contact,
but a reputation began to form of the fierceness of the cavalrymen while engaging any Japanese
patrol that was spotted, even when the cavalrymen were on a reconnaissance mission. The
Japanese sent out various patrols in search of any weakness, but would achieve mixed to poor
results.183 The night of January 19, Third Squadron bivouacked and formed a defensive
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perimeter. As Second Battalion and Third Squadron set of positions along the road, the Japanese
Yamazaki Detachment made two attacks on Third Battalion’s positions.
On January 18-19, the 612th and 613th Field Artillery Battalions began wreaking havoc
on the Japanese. They successfully knocked out targets including Japanese light tanks and one
of the dreaded 150 mm howitzers. Surprisingly the Japanese howitzer was knocked out by a
much smaller 75 mm pack howitzer. The long agonizing journey the artillery battalions had
endured bringing up the heavy artillery pieces finally paid dividends. On January 19, Second
Battalion made another frontal assault in order to take the Japanese positions on Loi-Kang Ridge
despite the success of pushing the Japanese off their positions although the Japanese’s fallback
position still allowed them to place accurate artillery fire on the MTF. 184
The battle for the valley began to take a different path for both the men of the MTF and
the Japanese troops defending it. Second Battalion of the 475th began encountering heavy
resistance. At the same time, the Japanese began fortifying their positions to stop any advance
leaving only frontal attacks as an option to root out the Japanese. This would prove difficult not
only for Second Battalion, but for the rest of the MTF in that their maps were inaccurate as to the
physical features of the valley. “Saddles, draws, ridges, knolls, pockets, ravines, and all other
conceivable topographical oddities popped up where they were at least expected from our study
of our maps to confuse the Marsmen and play into the hands of the defending enemy,” John,
Randolph wrote.185
By January 20 the battle for the valley had reached a new ferocity. Frontline troops of
the MTF were receiving little to no rations due to enemy anti-aircraft fire and small arms fire on

49

Hosi Valley Map. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World War
II: China-Burma India Theater Time Runs out in CBI.

the C-47s. This led to many troopers and soldiers looting dead Japanese troops in an effort to
ease their hunger. On one occasion, Pfc. James A. Leone followed his sergeant on an attack and
ran into a Japanese soldier in a foxhole. The battle of grenades ensued in which Leone wounded
a Japanese soldier who was then killed by the American sergeant. Leone quickly checked the
Japanese soldier and took his rations which included canned fish and some biscuits. “He
promptly sat down and ate--a welcomed feast after two and a half days with no rations,” John
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Randolph remembered.186 The need for food would become so desperate that many of the MTF
frontline soldiers ate anything and looted anything that was edible. They not only took food
from the dead Japanese but many of the men began looting food from their small supply depot.
All this was while the Japanese were putting up a fierce resistance. As was the case in other
theaters of the war in the Pacific, the Japanese often fought to the death. The Japanese also used
the tactic of suicide by grenade in an effort to kill as many of the enemy as possible. This
practice by the Japanese soldiers as in other theaters in the Pacific caused the men in the MTF to
retaliate harshly by dispatching any Japanese soldier quickly with extreme prejudice.187
On January 20 1945, the Third Squadron commenced their attack on their objective in
driving the Japanese off several of the ridges. As they were gaining a foothold on their newly
acquired territory, the Japanese struck twice with counterattacks. The Japanese on the hill fought
to the last man, a total of fifty Japanese soldiers died trying to stop the Third Squadron. Even
more Japanese died in their fierce counterattack. Fearful of being overrun, the Third Squadron
was forced to pull back and reassess their position. By nightfall on January 21, the Japanese
were driven back on one of the ridges and the men of Third Squadron dug in on the nearby rice
“paddy terraces.”188
At the time the Third Squadron secured its objective three battalions of the MTF were
along the Burma Road. Although Japanese resistance was encountered here it was not as heavy
as the MTF forces had expected. General Easterbrook had suggested further offensive action
along the Burma Road to General Willey but Willey had his hands full in trying to get the
Chinese First Regiment to the Americans. The Chinese 1st Regiment would not come to the aid
of the MTF even though they were technically attached to it. In a later account in Time Runs Out
in The CBI, General Willey criticized the Chinese for not wanting to be under the command of
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foreigners. Easterbrook wanted to move his forces toward the Burma Road which would enable
the American to harass the traffic, although there was no hope at this time of stopping it entirely.
General Willey had thought the plan was a good one but he needed more information on the
Chinese allies to the north. Everything depended on the Chinese linking up with MTF,
especially for adequate supplies and support. In the meantime the MTF was restricted to
“patrols, demolitions, and artillery fire.”189 By this time, however, the situation began to change
with elements of the Chinese 114th Regiment making contact with patrols of the MTF. This
created a stronger allied presence, but cooperation with the Chinese and the Americans was still
difficult.190
The Japanese also proved to be a serious deterrent to any effective air support. On many
occasions during the battle, squadrons of P-47s would execute strafing passes over the Japanese
positions. Aside from hitting ammo dumps, the P- 47s had limited results on the Japanese
bunkers. “As soon as a barrage or bombing run ended, they would pop up like gophers to rain
hand grenades down the hill on the slowly advancing GIs.” 191 Corporal Noel Hughes of the
612th Field Artillery Battalion described the frustration of their entrenched Japanese, “Still the
nips are holding their own, something is bound to crack soon. [T]he yellow squirts must be dug
in.”192 The P-47s were very effective in pinning down the Japanese but at times they were
hampered by Japanese anti-aircraft fire that took its toll on the P-47s and their pilots.193
The brutality of the Japanese Army became readily evident in the battle for the Hosi
Valley. One vivid example of the brutality was in the case of an American airmen who had his
parachute caught in a tree. The helpless pilot had been brutally mutilated by the Japanese. “His
genitals [were] removed and jammed into his mouth before [he] was strung up,” one soldier
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remembered.194 This was part of a psychological warfare by the Japanese in an attempt to
intimidate the Americans.
There are very few surviving accounts of the Japanese version of the fight for the Hosi
Valley, but in The Bastards of Burma there is correspondence between two Japanese soldiers
discussing their impending banzai attack on the MTF. The conversation is between two privates
named Matsu and Tamien. Their discussion consisted of how they are wary and somewhat
scared of attacking the Americans the next morning. Private Tamien said he was not afraid but
“more a sort of respect” in fighting Americans opposed to Chinese who they did not hold in high
regards.195 Matsu’s last entry in the conversation would be the most significant in providing an
idea of what the Japanese troops thought of the MTF. “Now we will be facing first-class fighting
men. The Americans have dropped two divisions of parachute troops to face us. I’m afraid,
Tamien we both are looking at our deaths in the morning.” 196
The Japanese were extremely alarmed by the Americans being so deep behind their lines
and along their staging area while they were attempting to hold off the Chinese to the north. The
Japanese had thought the Americans had landed paratroopers along the Burma Road. This belief
was based on the high amount of aerial activity in resupplying the MTF and the Japanese
mistakenly thought the Americans had landed an airborne division. On January 24, 1945, the
Japanese even sent word to the 56th Division fighting the Chinese of “a large airborne force
being landed along the Burma Road.”197 Alarmed at this news the commander of the 56th
Division contacted his superiors in the 33rd Army asking for permission to destroy his supplies
and retreat south. His superiors agreed on January 24, 1945, and the Japanese set out to evacuate
their casualties and bring back as much ammunition as possible. The Japanese 33rd Army
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commander dispatched “40 vehicles with gasoline accompanied by a Maj. Kibino of the 33d
Army Staff were sent north to support the 56th in its withdrawal.”198
This force under the command of Major Kibino would commence the long process of
running the Mars gauntlet to the 56th Division. Such a volume of traffic was certain to attract
the attention of the MTF who would attempt to close the Burma Road with artillery fire and
mines. If the MTF could effectively shell the Burma Road, the Japanese would be in a real
predicament. Yet the Japanese had more troops in the area than the Americans and the Chinese
combined.199 The Japanese troops’ objective was to hold their positions to enable the 56th
Division’s withdrawal. The MTF’s plan of attack would be to seize the high ground on the west
side of the Burma Road that was held by the Japanese. If the Americans could seize the high
ground they could ambush units of the Japanese on the road as well as shell it with artillery and
mine as much of the tract as possible. From January 21 until the middle of February, the battle
would move into a crucial stage as both sides struggled to hold as much of the high ground as
possible.200 To ensure the success of the Japanese 56th Division’s withdrawal, the Japanese
made good use of their artillery, especially their large 105mm howitzers. In an effort to allow
the Japanese convoys passing through the gauntlet a greater chance of survival, the Japanese
moved their men and supplies at night while at the same time unleashing their heavy artillery on
the MTF. The Japanese hit everything from the MTF headquarters to the poor mules. The
Japanese would also use diversionary attacks to distract the MTF from the road. These
operations “were personally directed by the 33rd Army Chief of Staff.”201 But the MTF did not
remain entirely on the defensive and frequently launched ground attacks in conjunction with the
Chinese 114th Regiment that was approaching the vicinity.202
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On January 21, 1945, the Third Squadron began clearing Japanese troops from the
hillside and killed over fifty Japanese soldiers. But the men of the Third Squadron, like those of
the rest of the MTF, had not eaten in several days. In some aspect this hunger helped them fight
harder in that they needed to dislodge the Japanese so the C- 47s could drop supplies. A serious
problem arose when the 124th seized more territory but their lines were became dangerously
thin. To remedy the situation, A and B troop from the First Squadron were attached to the Third
Squadron with the remainder of the squadron. For the men of the 475th it was terrifying to
consistently have to deal with the Japanese artillery and Japanese counterattacks on the ground.
There were few casualties during these attacks but they did take their toll on one precious
commodity of the MTF, their mules. The mules were killed in such large numbers that the men
of the 475th coined the name “Dead Mule Gulch” for one of the areas.203
Amidst fierce artillery duels, probing actions by squads became common. But the 475th
pressed on. Mines were successfully placed on the Burma Road that seriously disrupted the
night traffic by knocking out enemy vehicles. Although the men of the MTF were not able to
stop all traffic on the Burma Road they were a serious obstacle for the Japanese. Their success
included knocking out multiple light tanks and trucks that were aiding the withdrawal of the
Japanese 56th Division. Even Major Kibino’s personal light tank was knocked out by artillery
fire.204
On January 22_23, the battle for the Burma Road evolved into a series of deadly
skirmishes between companies and squads probing each other’s lines. The men of the MTF were
successful in their sporadic attacks and ambushes, but the Japanese were buying time for their
comrades. If the Japanese had known how weak the MTF’s line was they could easily have
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overwhelmed them. This was due to the small amount of replacements coming in by L-planes
and the large numbers of wounded starting to make an impact on the taskforce’s effectiveness.205
On January 24, 1945, the Second Battalion of the 475th launched attacks with I and R
Platoons as a reconnaissance probe across the Burma Road into the village Loi Kong, to
determine if the Japanese were using an alternate route to bypass the MTF positions. Third
Battalion actually sent reconnaissance patrols into the village. Both reconnaissance missions
encountered Japanese opposition which forced them to fall back in more skirmishing, but Second
Battalion did discover that only foot traffic had used the alternate route. While this was going
on, the duel of artillery continued with the Japanese gaining the upper hand by finding the 613th
Field Artillery’s position, killing two of the artillery men and forcing the rest of the 613th to
move quickly before they were wiped out.206 Both field artillery battalions picked up the pace by
placing rounds on the road to dissuade the Japanese trucks from making their runs at night. On
the other hand, the Japanese would use their artillery effectively since most of the 124th
Regiment were within artillery’s range. The soldiers began to dub the Japanese artillery,
especially the large 150 and 155mm guns, ‘whistling Willey” and 77mm guns as “whizbang”.207
The 77mm mountain gun earned its name by firing a “high glossy shell that all you heard was a
bang, a whiz, and another bang, so fast to you did not have time to seek cover.”208 Noel Hudges
of the 612th Artillery Battalion remembered 150 mm shells landing in the midst of the
Americans. “I pray to God that we can knock out that 150 out before something really happens
to us,” he remembered thinking.209 According to Capt. [first name here] Ness of the 612th Field
Artillery Battalion, the Japanese had three 150mm howitzers, four 105mm howitzers, and eight
75mm guns, as well as an unknown number of 70mm field pieces, all of which targeting the
MTF.210 The Japanese Air Force’s presence was negligible with only one real threat known as
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“Washing Machine Charley,” an unknown Japanese aircraft that attempted to bomb the MTF’s
lines with no real success.211
On January 25 and 26, the skirmishing among combat patrols continued. About this
time, the 124th discovered a Japanese ammo dump and successfully destroyed it. The Japanese
became a lot more stubborn in fighting off these probing actions by blocking trails and setting up
ambushes that resulted in scrapes between the MTF and the Japanese. On January 27, the Third
Battalion and 612th Field Artillery blasted the remaining Japanese positions on Loi Kang Ridge
but with little success.212 By now the Chinese 114th Regiment had taken a position further up
the Burma Road but they were detected by the Japanese and were attacked with light tanks.
As for the 124th, it began to make a name for itself with its aggressive tactics, but they
were victim of their own success and could not defend the large areas they captured. Most of the
fighting was done by the First and Third Squadrons of the 124th, but the Second Squadron was
also hurled into combat. As the Second Squadron moved into position between the First and
Third Squadron, the First Squadron commenced their attack by pushing the Japanese further out.
213

The Japanese resorted to staying in their bunkers and the troopers had to dispatch them
with grenades and bazookas. The Japanese tried fiercely to hold their ground but with little
success. A total of thirty-two bunkers were on the hilltop and when the Americans overran the
hill, thirty-four dead Japanese were found inside. American losses were placed at two killed and
seven wounded. In other previous engagements the Japanese would counterattack at night after a
successful American attack during the day. Indeed, a fierce counterattack came on the night of
January 29 on the defensive line of the First Squadrons. The Japanese commenced their attack
with artillery and mortar fire followed by a banzai charge. Their artillery inflicted casualties
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among the troopers, but the banzai attack floundered and eventually failed with the Japanese
fleeing shortly after they broke the American line.214 The Japanese stepped up their attacks on
the 124th’s perimeter by blasting them with artillery and probing night attacks. On January 31,
First and Second Squadron’s lines were attacked by the Japanese with all sorts of artillery.
Sergeant Camina was attached to the Second Squadron as a machine gun squad leader and
remembered these artillery bombardments by the Japanese and recalls, “at night the Japanese
bomb us with 81.mm mortars. This was the first time I was baptized by fire.”215 Sergeant
Camina also explained how the Japanese captured an unknown number 81mm mortars from the
allies and turned these guns on the Americans. Sergeant Camina recalled that in the mortar
attacks, “I felt the ground shake. I was scared to death. Nobody knows that feeling. Someone
tells you that they weren’t scared, they’re lying. I saw teeth chattering and men cry. [We] lost
about 10 men that day.” 216 The stalemate continued with artillery duels and probing actions.
On January 30, 1945, things began to change with the Japanese altering their tactics and
concentrating their artillery on certain portions of the MTF’s perimeter and the command
centers. Third Squadron took the brunt of the artillery barrage. The battle was becoming an eye
for an eye with artillery units from both sides taking heavy tolls. During the heaviest of the
shelling, the Japanese artillery destroyed the 612th Field Artillery’s ammunition dump, while the
613th Field Artillery knocked out one of the big Japanese 150 mm howitzers and a Japanese light
tank. The Japanese were heightening their defenses because the Chinese 88th Regiment was also
approaching the area held by the MTF. On January 31, both the First and Second Squadrons
were hit by Japanese counterattacks. John Randolph described how the “artillery and mortar
helped to drive them off.”217 Randolph and the men of the MTF men dreaded and hated the
Japanese infamous knee mortars. Knee mortars were light, maneuverable, and deadly light
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artillery. Something needed to be done by the MTF because the Japanese with their constant
harassment of the outer perimeter was taking a heavy toll on the Americans. At the same time,
the Chinese endeavored to take the Burma Road, but were almost annihilated. Most of their
artillery units were overrun by the Japanese on January 29.218
The Japanese were trying to bypass the MTF by following other trails near an area called
Hpa-pen. “Hpa-pen stood between the 124th and the Burma Road to the North East; American
interests in the Hpa-pen area might draw a very strong reaction from the Japanese,” as explained
in Time Runs out in the CBI.219 The high ground along Hpa-pen consisted of two hills that if
captured could help the 124th disrupt Japanese traffic on the Burma Road. Originally the
American plan was to take the hillsides around Hpa-pen with a joint American and Chinese
endeavor. The Chinese continued to push back the deadline for the attack, however. Col.
William Osborne the commander of the 124th, tried in vain to coordinate the movements of the
Americans with the Chinese 88th Regiment. The Second Squadron of the 124th would lead the
assault. A problem with this plan lay with the Japanese having an excellent field of observation
over the 124th perimeter such that any movement could be spotted and attacked by artillery.220
Troopers from Second Squadron began to move to the line of departure, but “mortar and
whizbang fire came in to make it to[o] hot.”221 Second Squadron in a diversion tactic was hit by
enemy artillery. The Second Squadron moved to another line and built more defenses which in
turn the Japanese began firing on. At that point, in an attempt to confuse the Japanese, the men
returned to their original defensive line which had previously been shelled by the Japanese.
“February 2nd was the big day for the 124th, the day when the entire Second Squadron attacked
the heart and backbone,” of the Japanese resistance, Randolph wrote.222
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The Chinese finally agreed to offer a company from the 89th Regiment as reserve for the
attack, while the rest of the regiment would provide support from the northwest. At six a.m. on
February 2, 1945, the MTF with its Chinese support commenced a heavy barrage of artillery on
the Japanese lines. In this battle for the Hosi Valley gallantry and courage would be an
understatement for what the men of Second Squadron would accomplish. The story of Second
Squadron is a crucial and overlooked part of this battle. Lt. Jack Knight led his troops up the
hillside through heavy wooded terrain. In the process the Americans were forced to run 1,500
yards and then climb another 400 feet to meet the enemy. As Lieutenant Knight made his way
to the top of the hill he killed two Japanese soldiers, but reaching the crest of the hill reported
that “there’s nothing up here!” 223 Although there were no enemy in sight, the Japanese artillery
fire was heavy and Knight ordered his men to dig in. In circling southwest of the hill the young
lieutenant came across an enemy pillbox and it was here the battle for Knight’s Hill began.
Sources vary on the number of Japanese on the hill, but the Japanese strength was somewhere
between 400 to 600. Sergeant Camina elaborated that “they were about 600 on that hill and we
would have to fight up [the] hill.”224 Knight took with him in his attack a special squad he
trained himself that consisting of Hispanic Americans under the command of squad leader Claus
Castro.225
Knight began his assault by hurling a grenade into the first pillbox and called back to his
men, “come on, there’s a whole nest of them down here!”226 To his surprise, Knight found
himself in the middle of a defensive line in the shape of a horse shoe. He had bravely begun the
assault without the assistance of his men. As the soldiers followed him up, they realized Knight
“looking and acting as if he had to get all of those emplacements by himself. He was fighting
like a madman.”227 During Knight’s heroic assault he was hit in the face by shrapnel from a

60
grenade, but continued the attack, seizing half of Lt. Leo C. Tynan’s ammunition. Tynan was
the artillery observer. Knight hurled a grenade and seized a second Japanese entrenchment but
was wounded a second time by a grenade. Knight’s brother, Curtis, who was his first sergeant,
came to his aid but the sergeant, too, was wounded. Knight was able to pull himself up and
called to his men to move forward and for someone to carry his brother to the rear for medical
assistance.228 Riddled with shrapnel Knight propped himself up tried “to reach another, his
six[th] pillbox,” when again he was hit by enemy fire. 229 After taking out at least six pillboxes
and leading what amounted to a ferocious attack on the Japanese fortifications, Knight finally
succumbed to his three wounds and died on the field of battle.
Sergeant Camina, who was a machine gun squad leader attached to the assault,
remembered how “the squad killed over 50 Japanese and Knight took out several himself.”230
The battle would be won, but to many of the troopers their thoughts were that “those bastards got
Jack Knight!” 231 For his gallantry Lt. Jack Knight was awarded the Congressional Medal of
Honor. Curtis Knight survived his wounds. Another example of a heroic assault was when Sgt.
Kim Hill jumped into a foxhole and discovered it was still occupied by a Japanese soldier who
stabbed him in the shoulder with his samurai sword. Sergeant Kim had “grab[ed] the sword,
pulled his own bayonet, and stabbed [the Japanese soldier] in the neck.”232 Another fascinating
incident in the fighting was when Sgt. Richard M. Hatfield tied a large Texas flag to his back.
Hatfield was a mortar observer who had become part of the assault on one of Japanese pillboxes.
In the assault, Hatfield was wounded in the leg by the shrapnel from a grenade. While
recovering in the aid station, Hatfield left to the plant the Texas flag on the captured hill but was
ordered to return to the aid station before he could do so.233 Once the battle was over, Hatfield
tried again to plant the flag on the hill but “was reminded, a lot of Yankees had fought like hell,
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too.”234 The rest of the men followed the example of the brave Texans in that many troopers
seized Japanese bunkers single-handedly, armed only with a submachine gun and a handful of
grenades.235
Elsewhere G Troop, after a heavy artillery barrage, much of which was phosphorus,
moved on their objectives with considerable success. Much of the artillery strike was directed by
Capt. William H. Wood, who had spotted a number of Japanese entrenchments in front of him.
Captain Wood had helped led the assault by picking up a .30 caliber machine gun that had lost its
mount and began firing “at pillboxes from the hip sometimes bracing the gun in the crotch of a
tree.”236 Wood had found his forward artillery observer dead and had called in the strikes
himself.237 The phosphorus rounds created panic among the Japanese and they began to flee
toward E and F Troop positions where they were cut down. Third Squadron along with L Troop
launched their attack at noon backed by reinforcements from K Troop. All were successful in
accomplishing their objectives. The Japanese retaliated, however, with heavy artillery fire which
inflicted more casualties among the troopers. On February 3, Troop B from the First Squadron
also secured their objective on the high ground. I Troop was also counterattacked but as the
soldiers had come to expect, the Japanese counterattacks were lopsided and failed to accomplish
anything other than throwing away men’s lives. In these three attacks, Second Squadron loss
twenty-two men while killing over 200 Japanese soldiers on the hill. L Troop had one casualty
and fifteen wounded compared to the Japanese loss of thirty-six of their own. B Troop would
lose one soldier and have five wounded.238
On February 2, 1945, the 475th took the remainder of the dreaded Loi Kang Ridge that
had been such a thorn in the side of the MTF but had now been successfully wrestled from the
Japanese. The 475th would execute this by a two pronged attack. While Second Battalion
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launched an assault on the southern slope while elements of First Battalion attack from behind.
“They knew full well the disaster that would befall them if there was one false move,” Randolph
wrote. 239 The attack commenced at 5:45 a.m. with a heavy artillery barrage by the 612th Field
Artillery along with the headquarters company of the First Battalion who fired mortars. This
barrage was supplemented by a 10,000 rounds of machine gun fire directed toward the remnants
of the village called Loi Kang on the southern slope of the ridge. After the barrage, Second
Battalion under Maj. John Lattin took the high ground between their line and the enemy held
village. Major Lattin would order his men to hold the Japanese attention as First Battalion
advanced on the Japanese. To maintain the element of surprise, First Battalion would have to
creep toward the enemy outpost “to strike without so much as breaking a twig or kicking a
rock.”240
The Japanese never knew what hit them as First Battalion annihilated a Japanese outpost
and its supporting elements. “Some of the sons of heaven drop[ed] dead while the rest scattered
and disappeared toward the main positions further along the ridge,” Randolph described.241 First
Battalion had the Japanese on the defensive and continued to push them off the ridge. This was
done largely by a Pfc. Clifton L. Henderson who used his Browning automatic rifle to clear a
path through multiple machine gun nests.242
The Japanese in Loi Kang village had been waiting to ambush First Battalion. The
Japanese planned to use the remains of the village and its location on a crest to bottleneck the
rushing First Battalion. The plan would have succeeded if the Japanese would have had better
control over their men but they had opened fire too early and the First Battalion had been alerted
as to their presence. Nonetheless, elements of the First Battalions were pinned down by the
Japanese small arms fire. At this time the Japanese brought up their artillery to bombard the
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attackers. The attack by the two American battalions began to falter and they were forced to pull
back. The Japanese remained in control of 500 yards of the ridge line. Second Battalion dug in
closer to the Japanese and flares were sent up in the early morning twilight to determine the
distance between the two battalions. It was safe to use artillery fire without the risk of friendly
fire since the two battalions were quite a distance from each other. A fifteen to twenty minute
artillery strike was unleashed on the Japanese defenses on the ridge. At night another artillery
barrage plus machine gun fire was rained down on the Japanese. When both battalions moved
forward they found to their great relief that the Japanese had been so weakened by the barrages
that they had fled. The engagement would cost the lives of two Marsmen.243
On February 4, I Troop of the 124th led by Lieut. Vern L Hughes ran into a Japanese
ambush. They had found the last strongpoint of the Japanese troops in the area, and the Japanese
were determined to fight. “Men were falling, dead and wounded, on all sides. Hopelessly pinned
down, they realize that their only chance was to call for help,” Lient. Hughes recalled.244 A
platoon from K Troop would be sent in to evacuate I Troop which sustained six dead and twentyfour wounded. The 124th retaliated with heavy artillery fire on the location where the Americans
had been ambushed. The Japanese melted away into the jungle, eluding the MTF. From
February 5 to 7, 1945, the Japanese attempted only half-hearted attacks. These attacks were
swept aside by mortar and artillery fire. The Japanese had become so confused and disoriented
they were frequently walking into MTF positions. By February 8 the Marsmen were officially
reported to be on “an administrative bivouac.”245 What remained of the Japanese forces had
pulled out of the area heading south. A large part of the Burma Road had been secured. The
battle had been won. Colonel Easterbrook perhaps described it best: “[A]fter all, we didn’t want
to March 300 miles for nothing.”246 For the other Marsmen’s thoughts were expressed in a poem
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by Pvt. Wade D. Hall of the Second Battalion: “The enemy was moving south, a week defeated
foe. For the men of mars had done their task, relief to China’s woe. And tomorrow it’s another
road that leads to Tokyo.”247
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CHAPTER V
TO LASHIO AND THE UNKNOWN
Once the Hosi Valley was secured, the MTF set up camp in the area creating an
encampment of tents made out of parachutes. With the Japanese on the run further south, the
Burma Road and the men could be resupplied by trucks rather than depend on the C-47s. At the
same time, the 511th Medical Collecting Company moved in the provide evacuation for the
wounded by ambulance rather than using the valuable L-planes.248 At this time, Lieut. Gen. Dan
I Sultan became commander of the new India-Burma Theatre which had been split from the
China Theatre. The forgotten Chinese First Regiment that was originally attached to the MTF
was handed over to the Chinese 50th Division to be used in the capture of Lashio to south of the
MTF.249
On February 18, 1945, Lord Louis Mountbatten visited the MTF encampment and
expressed his approval of the work of the Americans by saying that the Marsmen’s ratio of killed
enemy was six and a half compared to other allied units that had a ration of four to one. Lord
Mountbatten also praised the heroism of Lt. Jack Knight and promised that the hill where the
young lieutenant had died would be renamed “Knight’s Hill. 250” Before Lord Mountbatten
concluded his visit he hinted to the men of the MTF that he would like to have them in the
continued push against the Japanese to the south toward Mandalay and Rangoon, fighting on the
flank of the British 14th Army.251 The Generalissimo Chang Kai-shek and the theater
commander of China the Theater, Lieut. Gen. A. C. Wedemyer, however, had other plans for the
MTF. The Japanese had tried one last, desperate offensive in China to capture the American B29 super fortress airfields. “Washington, however, had grown so tired of dealing with Chang that
they gave in,” and it seemed the MTF was destined to be sent to China.252
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The future of the MTF seemed uncertain since the Japanese backs were broken in central
Burma, and most of the fighting was in China and the western Pacific. Despite this uncertainty,
the men endured and reorganized for the trip south along the Burma Road to the contested city of
Lashio. The 475th moved to Kutkai an airstrip outside Lashio on March 3rd 1945 to be flown to
China. As they left, rumors circulated that the cavalrymen were to be broken up and used
wherever they were needed in China. The 475th was deployed among the Chinese armies under
what came to be known as The Chinese Combat Command. The purpose of this combat unit was
to have experienced Americans train the Chinese in the war against the Japanese on the Chinese
mainland. Other members of the 475th were assigned to even “pipeline guard duty and M-P
duty.”253 Unaware to the men of the 124th Cavalry they were about to see more action against
the remnants of the Japanese outside Lashio. Although luck was on the side of the cavalrymen,
their lost allies from the 1st Chinese Regiment had defeated the last of the Japanese in the area
and thus saved the 124th from further combat.254
The same fate of the 475th being splintered to help the Chinese would also fall on the
cavalrymen. Having proven themselves in battle, the Marsmen were transferred to Kumming,
China to commence training the Chinese there. “Battle proven soldiers could instill more
confidence in the Chinese troops then command fresh from garrison training.”255 The state of the
Chinese army at the time was still extremely poor as many of the Chinese soldiers had been
involuntarily rounded up from villages and forced to serve in the Chinese military.256 Many
cavalrymen felt the 475th had been created in Burma and perhaps it should stay there. The
cavalrymen protested that their unit was a federalized National Guard unit that could not be
broken up. They “can’t do that to us!” one Marsmen angrily proclaimed.257 The last indication
of the MTF days in Burma was the order to return their mules to the quartermasters who would
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herd the mules back to Myitkyina.258 The parting of men with their mules can best be described
by Marvin A. Kastenbaum of the 613th Field Artillery Battalion: “We were mutually dependent,
and all of us, men and mules, campaigned together in Burma.”259
The new assignment of the MTF was to train the Chinese in the use their weapons. For
example, Sergeant Camina of the 124th, in March 1945, became a machine gun instructor for the
Nationalist Chinese Army in Kumming. In October of 1945, he returned to the states and was
discharged.260 Richard Bates a member of the 475th remembered how the Marsmen “were all
put on all jobs until we were shipped home. A lot of us wound up driving trucks.” 261 Richard
Bates, gives more details on why American drivers were chosen. He remembered that the
Chinese were never allowed to drive trucks with valuable supplies and the trucks were guarded
by armed American soldiers. This was done in an effort to prevent Chinese soldiers from
stealing the trucks and selling the supplies.262 Capt. John Montgomery of the 124th recalled how
he was sent all over China, from Kumming to Kweiyang, in an effort to set up supply bases for
the Chinese.263 Richard Hale of the 475th trained Chinese soldiers in the use of 4.2 heavy
mortars on the banks of the Yangtze River.264 In the 612th Artillery Battalion, Cpl. Hudges
describes going to Kunming with the motorized artillery, but arrived at camp and did nothing but
get a tan. Hudges summarized it as, “One day we were a bunch of dirty old fatigue wearers then
a bunch of rear echelon cowboys.”265
An interesting conversation that took place between two veteran Marsmen, Sgt. Gabe and
a soldier named Dilton, in discussing the future of China: “Chang Kai-shek is about ready to get
bounced out. The rest of the Chinese in Burma are knocking off the convoys using the Burma
Road, stealing most of the supplies, and burning what they can’t use.”266
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After the surrender of the Japanese and the end of the war in the Pacific, the Marsmen
returned to the United States at different times. Some were sent to Shanghai and were sent
straight home by boat. Richard Hale wrote how he ended up on a “victory ship” named the
Marine Angel and sent back home even before the war was over, in mid February 1945.267
Although many members of the task force stayed in Kumming and others in Calcutta for months,
they were sent home on any ship bound for the United States.268 It was a sobering and
heartbreaking end to a task force that had fought so hard and had done so much. For the
Marsmen the war would evolve into memory. What they did in Burma was in many ways a
humbling and life-changing event. Yet some felt their daring deeds had not had a lasting impact
due to the Nationalist Chinese government disintegrating and the war ending. 269
The history of the MTF would survive through reunions such as the 124th Cavalry
Association and Merrill’s Marauders who adopted the 475th. On October 14, 1972, a total of
twenty-seven after the battle of Hosi Valley, the city of Mineral Wells, Texas commemorated a
monument to Lt. Jack Knight who was from Mineral Wells. The monument has a short
description of F Troop and its history before and during World War II. The “4-foot solid marble
monument honoring Knight and the men of the memories of the unit,” was purchased with funds
from members of F Troop. 270 Lord Mountbatten would travel all the way to Mineral Wells for
the memorial’s dedication.271
With the passage of time and the death of many of the veterans, the memory of the MTF
began to fade. A number of historians who ably wrote of Operation Galahad completely
neglected the MTF although there was information available, especially the written recollections
of the Marsmen themselves. What little that was written had been brief and does little justice to
the veterans. Many historians simply ignore the MTF and bestow the credit for the defeat of the
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Japanese in Burma on the Chinese, British, or the veterans of Operation Galahad. “To me,”
Richard Hale wrote, “that was typical of the distortion of the history of World War II.”272
Hopefully, in some small way, this thesis will help to rectify that historical oversight and bring to
light the actions of a brave band of men who fought and died in a remote corner of a remote
theatre of World War II.

San Antonio Group Photo in Burma. Robert Camina Collection.
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